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 1 
Abstract 
 
 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 recommendations suggest a legislative 
and institutional framework to prevent Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. The 
financial and human cost of implementing 40 FATF recommendations is very high and there 
has been no proper evaluation of the effectiveness of the FATF recommendations in increasing 
communications to the police. I identify a set of 9 FATF recommendations that have been 
largely ignored by legislators and target important issues: surveillance of Politically Exposed 
Persons, Beneficial Ownership, Transaction Reporting and Independence of 
Investigation. I explain compliance with the FATF recommendations, specially the sub set of 
9 recommendations, with cultural, institutional and socio-economic variables. I introduce a 
new variable: the number of Political Mandates; to proxy the political environment of 
countries. I show that compliance with the FATF recommendations is positively related to 
increases in communications of Suspicious Activity Reports to the police for a sample of 23 
countries. Finally, I show that the 9 special recommendations have a stronger impact on these 
communications than the FATF 40 recommendations  
 
 O GAFI (Grupo de Ação Financeira Internacional) sugere a adoção de 40 
recomendações da sua autoria para a prevenção do Branqueamento do Capital e do 
Financiamento do Terrorismo. Os custos de implementação a nível financeiro e humano são 
muitos elevados e não houve até à data uma avaliação sobre a eficácia destas recomendações 
em aumentar o número de investigações policiais. Eu identifiquei 9 recomendações que lidam 
diretamente com os seguintes tópicos: averiguação de Pessoas Politicamente Expostas, 
Beneficiário Efetivo; Relatórios de Transação e Independência de Investigação. Eu utilizo 
fatores culturais, institucionais e socioeconómicos para explicar a conformidade com as 40 
recomendações do GAFI; especialmente com estas 9 recomendações. Eu introduzo uma nova 
variável: o número de Mandatos Políticos, numa tentativa de capturar o impacto da 
instabilidade política. Mostro ainda que a adoção das recomendações do GAFI está 
positivamente relacionada com o aumento de Relatórios de Atividades Suspeitas recebidos 
pelas várias polícias numa amostra de 23 países. No fim, eu mostro que as 9 recomendações 
têm um impacto maior no número de relatórios recebidos do que as 40 recomendações. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering is an 
intergovernmental organization that suggests a legislative and institutional framework for 
countries to adopt in order to fight Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorist Acts 
(ML/FT). Its body of work consists of 40 individual recommendations that should be adopted 
at the country level. This framework includes, among others, operational procedures for the 
Criminal Police, which has the responsibility to conduct investigations on reports on suspicions 
of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The present framework includes 40 
recommendations. I suspect that of these 40 recommendations, 9 should be addressed more 
carefully for efficiency and cost purposes. Countries have gone to different depths of adoption 
of the FATF recommendations. The FATF recommendations find their way into the national 
legislations by directives and treaties sponsored by several international organizations and 
conventions.  
 There has been criticism of the FATF’s approach to ensure a proper international set of 
rules to avoid ML/FT. These criticisms fall mainly on the large number of recommendations 
and the disparity between countries vis-à-vis their internal resources. The FATF 40 
recommendations suggest the creation of the same institutions and laws in all countries. These 
require skilled human resources and financial means in a way that small island nations, 
developing countries and small economies can never make available in the same way as first 
world countries can. Even in powerful economies, the resources (financial and human) spent 
on compliance efforts are substantial and its effectiveness has not been properly assessed. A 
proper effectiveness analysis of the current compliance framework of the FATF is largely 
overdue, specially since the resources allocated to compliance have substantially increased 
since the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis.  
 A careful analysis of the FATF Reports on different countries unveils a pattern of 
deceitful compliance, with the international guidelines. Countries adopt many of the 40 
recommendations, but fail to properly ensure full compliance with certain recommendations 
which are effectively related to the prevention of ML/FT. I have isolated 9 FATF 
recommendations which deal directly with: Politically Exposed Person; Beneficial 
Ownership; Transaction Reporting; and Independence of Investigation. These 4 topics are 
crucial pillars of a sound judicial system and have a direct impact on the prevention of crime. 
 Even though countries can freely join the FATF group, compliance with the 40 
recommendations is not mandatory because the FATF is devoid of coercive power. Countries 
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adopt its recommendations independently as the result of national and international factors. 
The national factors that operate behind compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations were 
studied by Yepes (2011) who isolated cultural, institutional and socio-economic variables to 
explain compliance in a sample of 116 countries. Yepes also mentioned that the lack of 
information on criminal activities related to ML/FT made impossible to assess the extent to 
which compliance with the FATF framework had a decreasing impact on crime. I have 
collected information on the early stages of criminal investigations1 over ML/FT for a sample 
of 23 countries thus allowing briefly to assess the efficacy of the FATF framework. 
 In my thesis I use the same factors Yepes uses plus one additional variable: the number 
of political mandates; to explain compliance with the 40 and 9 FATF recommendations in my 
sample of 23 countries. I complement Yepes’ work by assessing the impact of compliance with 
these two sets of recommendations on criminal investigations.  
 I find that the cultural, institutional and socio-economic factors are still significant in 
explaining compliance with the 9 recommendations. This happens because the attitude towards 
Politically Exposed Persons, Beneficial Ownership, Transaction Reporting, and Independence 
of Investigation captured in compliance with the 9 recommendations is more sensitive on 
cultural, institutional and socio-economic factors than the plethora of issues covered in the 40 
recommendations, specially in an environment of non-coerciveness dependent on political free 
will. I also suggest that the governments’ attitude towards these 4 crucial topics is dependent 
on the stability of the political system: To proxy this stability, the number of political mandates 
for the period 1970-2016 was added to the explanatory variables. Finally, I estimate the impact 
of compliance with the 9 recommendations, is stronger than the impact of the overall 40 FATF 
recommendations, on criminal investigations.  
 The findings in this thesis validate the choice of variables in Yepes to proxy cultural, 
institutional and socio-economic factors which explain different levels of compliance across 
countries; the impact of political stability on compliance; the relative effectiveness of the FATF 
framework in improving criminal investigations and a reinforcement of the argument for case 
specific ML/FT guidelines over the current FATF approach of one size fits all. Measuring the 
effectiveness of the FATF regime is almost impossible because there is no centralized 
information on ML/FT related crime that can be linked to Compliance. As such, I focus on the 
early stages of the criminal process, which starts by Suspicious Activity Reports submission 
which can be linked to compliance with the FATF regime. 
                                                 
1 Information on Criminal Investigations was not available in 2011; 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 The FATF and the 40 Recommendations 
 
Money Laundering is “any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally 
obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources”. 
Illegally obtained funds are laundered and moved around the globe using and abusing shell 
companies, intermediaries and money transmitters. In this way, the illegal funds remain 
hidden and are integrated into legal business and into the legal economy2. (Interpol, 2017). 
 
 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering is an 
intergovernmental organization created by the G7 in 1989, which Initially had 16 members and 
as of 2017 counts 35. The FATF issued 40 recommendations with the aim of “improving 
national legal systems, enhancing the role of the financial sector and intensify cooperation in 
the fight against money-laundering. The FATF has a set of 40 recommendations which must 
be adopted at a country level to restrain Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorist3 
acts. The FATF regularly conducts evaluations at the national level called Mutual Evaluations, 
in which the compliance with the 40 recommendations is assessed. Compliance is classified in 
4 categories: Non-Compliant, Partially Compliant, Largely Compliant and Compliant. The 40 
recommendations are divided according to their scope in: Legal Measures, Institutional 
Measures, Prevention in Financial Institutions; Prevention in the Informal Sector; Entity 
Transparency; International Cooperation; Anti-Money Laundering and Criminalization 
of Terrorist Financing. The FATF recommendations include duties that fall upon, what the 
FATF denominates, subject entities. The FATF divides subject entities into Financial 
Institutions and Designated Non-Financial Business Professionals (DNFBPs). Inside the 
DNFBPs, one can find the sub group of Legal Professionals4 The recommendations suggest 
the creation of laws to fight Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and the creation of a 
specialized unit inside each country’s police to deal with such issues: The Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU).  
 The recommendations state clearly the duties that each activity group (Financial 
Institutions, DNFBPs and Legal Professionals) are compelled to fulfil. The duties include 
                                                 
2 Interpol 2017; 
3 ML/FT; 
4 See Table 1: FATF Subject Entities;  
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informing the FIU whenever a suspicious situation arises. The criteria for a situation to be 
classified as suspicious are defined throughout the 40 FATF recommendations on a general 
plane, and at a national level, depending on the level of adoption of each country of the FATF 
recommendations. Suspicious situations occur whenever a professional group enters into a 
business transaction with an agent, whose behaviour, purpose and modus operandi, might 
suggest, within the legal criteria, that there is reason to suspect the existence of Money 
Laundering or Terrorist Financing activities. The following examples illustrate simply what 
can originate a suspicion of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: If a regular bank 
costumer whose account movements were stable for a long time, suddenly starts moving large 
quantities of money, the bank should inform the FIU; If a Palestinian national decides to open 
an account in Portugal, the bank should inform the FIU; If a bank account is the recipient of 
funds which originate in complicated regions of the world, the bank should again inform the 
FIU; If a client approaches a lawyer for the creation of a legal arrangement which conceals the 
beneficiary owner of such a legal instrument, and if the lawyer suspects the existence of Money 
Laundering or Terrorist Financing, he or she should inform the FIU; If a costumer suddenly 
appears in a money exchange bureau and exchanges large and unusual amounts of currency, 
the money exchanger should inform the FIU.  
 The subject entities inform the FIU that they suspect some illegal activity is being 
perpetrated by submitting Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). These reports are informative 
in nature. They provide the necessary information required by law to be provided to the FIU. 
The FIU in turn, analyses the reports. The FATF insists that only the FIU should have the power 
and the means to analyse these reports to ensure independence of investigation.  
 The FIU internally decides whether there are grounds to conduct an investigation or 
not. If not, the SARs are archived. If there is evidence of illegal activities the FIU starts the 
investigation by disseminating the SARs to the investigation department inside the FIU or to 
any other existent prosecutorial body in that particular jurisdiction, which is entitled to conduct 
criminal investigations. There are 4 types of FIU5: Police-Type, Administrative, Law Enforcing 
and Hybrid. These differences arise from the different statute of the criminal police in each 
country prior to the creation of the FIU. In any case, once there is a confirmation of a suspicion 
the SARs are disseminated and give way to an investigation by the prosecutorial authorities.   
                                                 
5 see Table 2: Financial Intelligence Units, an Overview, IMF 2004; 
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 In short the process goes as follows: There is a suspicious situation, the subject entities 
report it to the FIU which analyses them. The FIU either archives the reports or disseminates 
them to start an investigation. The investigations can be undertaken by the FIU or by other 
prosecutorial authorities. If the FIU has the power to start an investigation and act as a 
prosecutorial authority depends on the status of the FIU in that jurisdiction. However, the FATF 
states clearly that the FIU alone has privy to the information in the SARs before choosing to 
disseminate them. No other body should be able to analyse SARs. This process is displayed in 
Figure 1. Not all countries comply fully with the FATF recommendations. In fact, compliance 
is around 40% with clear differences in compliance scores between developed and developing 
countries6. As such, it is not possible to have such a stream lined flow of information as 
displayed in Figure 1. Some countries have different internal realities, with more agents 
exerting their influence in the flow of information. The FATF has this in account and states 
that, the FIU alone7, should have the power to analyse SARs arising from suspicions of Money 
Laundering or Terrorist Financing. As such, deviant national systems should be reorganized to 
comply with the process described in Figure 1. Many Countries, Portugal included, have what 
is called a dual system. 
Figure 1: Optimal information flow with full compliance with the FATF 40 
Recommendations. 
 
Notes: Suggested Framework for dealing with SARs under full compliance; Bernardo Vidal (2017)  
                                                 
6 Yepes (2011); 
7 See Recommendations 20 and 29; 
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Figure 2: Information Flow without full Compliance8 (Portuguese Case) 
 
 Notes: Suggested Framework for dealing with SARs with distortions due to incomplete compliance with the 9 
recommendations; Bernardo Vidal (2017) 
 
 A dual system is a system in which, SARs are submitted to the FIU and to another 
institution. In Portugal, SARs are submitted to the FIU and to the Procuradoria Geral da 
República. The FIU in Portugal has to inform the Procuradoria Geral da República of the SARs 
it has received, what do they contain and what investigation are they planning to conduct. The 
Procuradoria Geral also has the power to conduct its investigations, parallel to the FIU. This 
creates enormous conflicts of interest, transparency and legitimacy, as the Procuradoria Geral 
da República is a political body, dependent of the government. Other variants of this process 
exist in more countries, but they can mostly be schematized with a graph found in Figure 2. 
 
 Non compliance with specific recommendations is transversal across countries, with 
the lowest levels of compliance being found among the recommendations that stipulate the 
duties of Legal Professionals. This is especially critical given that lawyers and legal service 
providers play key roles in establishing legal arrangements through which Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing can occur. I have identified the set of recommendations which remain 
                                                 
8 Other Institution would be the Procuradoria Geral da República, a National Bank, a 
Supervisory Authority or any other institution which has investigative power within that 
specific jurisdiction; 
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largely ignored at the national level, not only in Portugal, but as said before, across many other 
countries in the Mutual Evaluation Reports of the FATF. These recommendations cover the 
following topics: Politically Exposed Persons, Beneficial Ownership, Transaction 
Reporting and Independence of Investigation. 
 
 Politically Exposed Person (PEP) is a concept used for individuals who have held 
prominent public functions. It covers Domestic PEPs; Foreign PEPs, International 
Organization PEPs, Family members of PEPs and close associates9. Proper surveillance 
of PEPs is a challenging process but nonetheless necessary as the ties between politics 
and business are at times very tight; 
 Transaction Reporting covers the need to report whenever a Bank transfers funds from 
location X to location Y. This is extremely important if one of these locations is for 
example, a Tax Haven, war zone or a country which does not cooperate with 
international practices;  
 Beneficial Ownership entails the right of prosecutorial authorities to access 
information regarding the beneficial owners of legal entities settled domestically and 
abroad for the purpose of conducting criminal investigations in a time frame compatible 
with the successful conclusion of the investigation; 
 Independence of Investigation is extremely important. Investigators should be free 
from political pressures in the course of their investigations. In Portugal, SARs are 
submitted to a Dual Reporting System, which forces subject entities to report directly 
to the FIU and to Procuradoria Geral da República. This is contrary to what the FATF 
regime suggests and creates conflicts of interest. Subject Entities should file SARs 
only to the FIU. 
 Some countries also fail to avoid the dual system and to properly define and adopt, 
at a national level, the duties of the subject entities as defined by the FATF. Therefore, Legal 
Professionals remain largely unregulated within the FATF Framework. The relevant Legal 
Professionals are: Lawyers; Notaries; Tax and Accounting Professionals and Registry 
                                                 
9 UNCAC Article 52: United Nations Convention against Corruption on asset recovery: 
analysis of reported compliance and policy recommendations; 
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Services, while the relevant financial subject entities in are Banks and Insurance Companies. 
I have identified the set of recommendations which remain largely ignored at the national level, 
not only in Portugal, but in other countries. Portugal in particular has made no effort to improve 
its compliance with the recommendations that demand a clearer definition of duties for subject 
entities, the end of the dual system and regulations for Legal Professionals. This is 
demonstrated in the Mutual Evaluations of 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Non compliance with 
these recommendations has direct impacts on the duties of subject entities, the obligation to 
report SARs and in the powers of the FIU. Non compliance in turn depletes the quality of the 
judicial system and of the law enforcement authorities because it allows for illegal behaviours 
to remain undetected, not investigated and ultimately, not criminalized. Figure 3 accurately 
highlights the stages in the optimal process, as defined by the FATF in Figure 1, that are directly 
affected by poor compliance of the selected group of recommendations. 
 
Figure 3: Areas affected by non-compliance with the Key Set of Recommendations 
 
Notes: Poor compliance with the Key Set of 9 recommendations directly effects the Duties of Subject Entities, the regulation of Legal 
Professionals and the Independence of the FIU. Bernardo Vidal (2017) 
 
 The sub set of 9 recommendations which have critical impacts in the system will be 
henceforth known as the Key Set. This Key Set of recommendations is striking in a number of 
aspects. First, they remain largely ignored by most jurisdictions. These recommendations were 
almost never fully adopted and the periodic evaluations conducted by the FATF at the country 
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level over the last two decades have detected practically no increase in compliance10.  the low 
level of political will to implement them. Second, they are linked to serious distortions in the 
system proposed by the FATF (Figure 2). Third, they directly refer to proper surveillance of 
Politically Exposed Persons, Lawyers, other Legal Professionals and Non Cooperative 
jurisdictions (off-shores, opaque jurisdictions and repressive regimes)11. Forth, they score the 
lowest compliance scores among all 40 FATF recommendations12. For simplicity there is a 
short summary of each recommendation below: 
 
 Rec.10: Costumer Due Diligence- Financial Institutions should evaluate the client and 
his actions according to the FATF Standards (nationality, sums involved, origins and 
destinations of transfers); 
 
 Rec.12: Politically Exposed Persons -The FIU should be informed whenever a subject 
entity enters into a business transaction with a politically exposed person; 
 
 Rec.14: Natural and Legal Persons who provide money or value transfer services 
should be licensed and surveyed under the proper sanctions; 
 
 Rec.16: Wire Transfers: Banks should inform whenever they make transfers to non 
cooperative jurisdictions and accurately identify the originator or the transfer and the 
identity of the beneficiary; 
 
 Rec.20: Filling an SAR should be compulsory by law (Lawyers are not obliged to do 
so) SARs must be directed to the FIU; 
 
 Rec.22: Duties of Legal Professionals should be clearly defined in the law and proper 
sanctions should be in place; 
 
                                                 
10 See FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports; 
11 The complete text of the Key recommendations can be found in page 41 of the Appendix; 
12 Recommendations 10 and 12 have the lowest compliance score of all 40 recommendations; 
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 Rec23: Other Measures regarding DNFBPs. Lawyers, notaries, independent Legal 
Professionals and accountants, dealers of precious stones, trust and company service 
providers should report whenever they face a suspicious activity. 
 
 Rec.24: There should be transparency about the Beneficial Owner of Legal Persons 
and Legal Arrangements (Bearer Shares Societies, Off-shores, Trusts, Non-Profit 
Organizations); 
 
 Rec.28: There Should be a regulatory body for each group of Subject Entities (Portugal: 
Banco de Portugal, CMVM, ASAE, Ordem dos Advogados and so forth). 
 
 It should be evident by now that the issues tackled in the Key Recommendations are 
directly linked to the prevention of large scale white collar crime.  
  
 Money Laundering per se is usually a harmless activity. The harm lies in the activity 
which originates the need to launder money. In the case of large scale white collar crime, harm 
can go a long way. As such, and given the wide spread presence of cases of white collar crime, 
which link politically exposed persons, the financial sector and the failure of the regulatory 
bodies, it is logical to question the practical effectiveness of complying with the FATF 
recommendations and its inherent costs. More so because countries which have complied to a 
large extend have nonetheless registered plenty of crimes.  
  
 Measuring the effectiveness of the FATF recommendations is not a straightforward 
task. It is not possible to establish correlations between SARs and Convictions because the 
processes go through different institutions and have different references throughout (Yepes, 
2011). Also, there is no centralized information on SARs and Convictions. So, an analysis of 
the effectiveness of the FATF recommendations cannot include the whole process presently. 
As such, I focus on the first stages of the process using the information published in the FIU’s 
Official Annual Reports. I use SARs fillings, Disseminated SARs and SARs by origin 
(submitted by the different subject entities: Banks; Casinos; Insurance Companies; Lawyers; 
Notaries; Money Exchangers and the remaining subject entities). Legal Professionals are 
notorious for the extremely low number of SARs filled. This is not surprising, as the 
recommendations that force them to submit SARs are largely ignored.  
 17 
 
 These three pieces of information: number of SARs, origins of the SARs and 
Disseminated SARs, already allow for some measure of effectiveness when linked with the 
compliance level of the FATF recommendations. It is possible to establish a link on how 
compliance with the FATF recommendations influences the total number of SARs, SARs by 
Disseminated SARs and SARs submitted by Legal Professionals. More specifically, I want to 
see how compliance with this restricted set of 9 recommendations, the Key Set, is related to 
SARs fillings and Dissemination.  
 
 It is relevant to assess the power of the relationship between the FATF 
recommendations and the SARs filled and disseminated for investigation because: First, as 
mentioned before, the resources spent on the adoption of new regulations are considerable. 
Second, compliance with all the FATF regulations demands specialized professionals, which 
might not be at reach of small and middle scale businesses. Thirdly, when ineffective, excessive 
regulation can be a burden for the economy, especially small ones, such as Portugal13. It can 
be an economic burden, as well as an operational burden, as vital resources are diverged 
towards compliance related issues. To address the matter, this thesis is divided into three parts. 
 
 Parts 1 and 2 are similar and differ only in the sample of countries used. In the 1st part 
there is a replication of the methodology of Yepes (2011, IMF) for a sample of 116 countries. 
Yepes found that compliance with the FATF regime is positively related to the level of 
economic development and domestic governance. Compliance was measured by constructing 
an Index from 0 to 1 that measures the level of adoption of the FATF recommendations. 
Economic development and domestic governance were captured by two sets of independent 
variables: cultural and institutional variables and socio-economic variables. Yepes’ method 
assessed which factors underlie the compliance index with the FATF 40 recommendations and 
its individual components but did not link the FATF regime with SARs due to lack of 
information. This methodology provides a solid empirical base to subsequently analyse 
compliance with the 9 Key recommendations.  
 
 In the 2nd part the sample is restricted to 23 countries. The criteria for the restriction is 
the existence of public information on SARs, which only 23 countries publish. This special set 
                                                 
13 Hubli and Geiger (2004); 
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of recommendations was collected from the Mutual Evaluation Reports of the FATF at a 
national level. My sample consists of 23 heterogeneous countries. Information on SARs for the 
period 2006-2015 was collected from 189 reports published by the financial authorities of each 
country. The same procedure of the 1st part is repeated with 23 countries to assess if the 
variables which explain compliance with the FATF 40 recommendations and the FATF40 
Index components in the large sample, also hold explanatory power in the 23 country sample. 
There is a potential loss of information by reducing the sample from 116 to 23, even though 
the time period under analysis is larger, with 10 years versus the initial 5. Nevertheless I have 
more observations (230) than Yepes ( circa 86)14. 
 
 The 3rd Part is the core of the analysis. The same methodology is applied but with 
different dependent variables. Instead of the FATF compliance index and its components, I 
computed a new index, called the Key Index, in which compliance with the set of 9 
recommendations which I have isolated is evaluated. Analogous to the FATF40 Index 
components, the components of my Key Index are the individual recommendations I have 
isolated15.  I computed this index using the same procedure as Yepes (2011). A new explanatory 
variable will be added to the independent variables in parts 3: the number of Political Mandates 
between 1976-2016. This acts as a proxy for the political landscape of the 23 countries. Finally, 
to address the effectiveness of the FATF recommendations, the relationship between SARs 
fillings, SARs Disseminated for investigation and SARs fillings by Legal Professionals I do 
three simple regressions. In these regressions, the dependent variables are the SARs and the 
independent variables are the FATF40 Index and the Key Index.  
 
 The results show that, the factors which explain compliance with the FATF40 Index 
have a stronger explanatory power when the sample goes from 116 to 23 countries. The results 
also show that those same factors have a stronger explanatory power in explaining compliance 
with the Key Index and its individual 9 recommendations, than with the FATF40 Index and its 
individual components. It is also found that the variable Political Mandates is very significant 
in explaining compliance with the Key Index, and that it has a negative impact. Finally, both 
indexes, the FATF and the Key Index are shown to have an impact on the number of SARs 
                                                 
14 Yepes (2011) used the average values for the period 2004-2008 whereas I use yearly 
observations; 
15 Recommendations 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24 and 28; 
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filled, the number of SARs filled by Legal Professionals and the SARs Disseminated for 
Investigation. The difference between the indexes is that the Key Index has a stronger estimated 
impact on all 3 dependent variables, than the FATF40 Index. This suggests that some 
recommendations are more important than others with the Key Set of recommendations being 
more related to the designated socio and economic factors. 
 
2.2 Summary of International and National Efforts in Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulation 
 
 After the creation of the FATF there has been an increase in the public awareness of 
the risks and consequences of Money Laundering and its connection to terrorist attacks. The 
wide spread knowledge of the reputational, economic, and social effects of the illegal activities 
connected to Money Laundering actions has, in part, been in the background of several political 
initiatives that seek its prevention and elimination. In 1988 the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, sought to establish a 
general framework to control the above mentioned problems. The FATF was created in 1989 
in the follow up of the 1988 United Nations Vienna convention. Its expression at the European 
level came in November the 11th of 1990 with the signature of the Convention on Money 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. This was promoted 
by the Council of Europe which brought together all its then members in addition to non-
member states which were also present during the elaboration of the final regulations, which 
were based on FATF regulations.  
  
 The FATF predicts the creation of a Financial Intelligence Unit in every country to deal 
with the issues of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. To fulfil this, the Egmont Group 
was created in 1995. The Egmont Group is an international organization whose members are 
the several FIUs from around the world. Besides the establishment of an FIU, it seeks to foster 
the exchange of information and institutional cooperation between it’s members. The national 
expression of this agreement is the UIF- Unidade de Informação Financeira, incorporated in 
Polícia Judíciária, which started operations in 2009. 
 
 In 1997, the United Nations created the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNDOC), merging the former United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention. Inside the UNDOC there is a specialized division responsible 
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for “carrying out the Global Programme against Money-laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the 
Financing of Terrorism” called The Law Enforcement, Organized Crime and Anti-Money 
Laundering Unit. This unit operates in many countries either directly or, in cooperation with 
national institutions, namely, the FIUs.  
  
 The year 2000 saw the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, symbolically held in Palermo Italy. Focused mainly on human and arms traffic, it was 
nonetheless valuable because it brought together many governments and established the joint 
commitment to implement, at a national level, the resolutions of that same convention. 
In 2001 the United Nations adopted resolution 1373 which brings to light the need to broaden 
the scope of what is considered a crime or an offense in the fields of Money Laundering and 
the Financing of Terrorism. The resolution therefore “imposed certain obligations on Member 
States, such as the prevention and the suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, the 
criminalization of terrorism-related activities and of the provision of assistance to carry out 
those acts, the denial of funding and safe haven to terrorists and the exchange of information 
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts”16. Such a task further reinforced the need for 
cooperation of the financial and non financial sectors at the national levels.  
 
 New guidelines to protect national financial systems from being unknowingly used to 
finance terrorism were published in in April 2002, in line with the resolutions from the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). 
The year 2005 saw the combined efforts of the IMF and the UNODC produce a compendium 
of Model-Legislation on Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. This compendium 
brought together expertize from experts in international civil law. Its goal is to serve as a 
practical guideline for the adoption of the UN convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime directives in civil law jurisdictions. The same was made in 2009 with the the Model 
Provisions for Common Law Legal Systems on Money-Laundering, Terrorist Financing, 
Preventive Measures and the Proceeds of Crime17. 
 
 In Portugal the evolution of the legal and institutional framework is mostly the result 
of the adoption of EU directives. Up until 1993, Money Laundering was not considered an 
                                                 
16 United Nations Instruments and Other Relevant International Standards on Money-
Laundering and Terrorist Financing; 
17 UNDOC, Commonwealth Secretariat, IMF (2009); 
 21 
offence in the Portuguese judicial system. It only became so with Decree Law nr.15/93 of 
January the 22nd. This decree law came two years after Directive 91/308/EEC “on the 
prevention of the use of the Financial System for the purpose of Money Laundering” (UIF), 
which was approved by the Council of the European Economic Community in 1991. Still in 
1993, the Portuguese Parliament passed Decree Law nr.313/93 which “created a number of 
obligations for all financial institutions (either bank or non-bank financial institutions, 
including currency exchange businesses - “bureaux de change”) and for offshore branches”, 
hence, enlarging the number of subject entities in the Portuguese system. DNFBPs and their 
duties were defined later in 1995 with Decree Law nr.325/95. Portugal deepened its 
international cooperation ties by passing the Decree law nr.144/99 on August the 31st to provide 
“mutual cooperation with the authorities of other countries in the fields of extradition, transfer 
of criminal cases and the execution of sentences (…), transfer of convicted persons and 
assistance in criminal matters, including the detection, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds 
of criminal activities”18. Finally, in 2008, Law nr.20/2008 of April the 21st further deepened 
the duties of all Subject Entities. However, as seen by the mutual evaluations undertaken in 
Portugal by the FATF, the state of compliance has remained static, with no effort being made 
in the set of key recommendations. 
 
 The FATF also evolved over time. It updated its recommendations in 1996 and in 2001. 
It included UN resolution 1737, drafted in the follows up of 9/11, in its mandate and issued 
new recommendations directed at particular sectors of the economy with the aim of 
incorporating the new, broader view o Money Laundering and specially, the Financing of 
Terrorism (+9). In 2012, all the recommendations were revised and compiled into just 40 
recommendations. In 2006 a new milestone was reached in the UN General Assembly of 
September the 20th. Resolution 60/288 drafted by the UN Security Council, with high emphasis 
on preventing the financing of terrorist acts made the implementation of the 40+9 
recommendations mandatory. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 UIF (2016); 
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2.3 Literature Review of Money Laundering  
 
 This section serves to strengthen the notions of why Anti-ML/FT policies should be 
addressed, why there should be a focus on the 9 recommendations which I have mentioned 
over the course of the previous sections and why we should account for political stability when 
studying how well countries adopt the FATF recommendations directly linked to Politically 
Exposed Person; Beneficial Ownership; Transaction Reporting; and Independence of 
Investigation. 
 
 Money Laundering is a socially and economically relevant topic and it has been the 
widely discussed in many international organizations from 1989 onwards, when the FATF was 
created.  The Money Laundering process is characterized by three stages: Placement; Layering; 
and Integration. The placement phase is when illegally earned money if placed into the 
financial system before undergoing a series of operations that serve to disguise the origins of 
such funds (Layering). When the money’s origins are properly disguised, the money enters the 
“official” financial system and the authorities’ loose tract.  Precaution measures fall upon the 
first two stages, placement and layering, because is is then that criminals are more vulnerable 
and exposed (UIF, 2016).  
  
 The practice of Money Laundering is usually tied to the traffic of illegal substances and 
materials or to economic crime, namely, White Collar Crime. Economic crime is defined as 
crime which does not involve the physical destruction of something, rather it results in a 
financial loss and usually tied to the “criminal activities of Fraud, Abuse of Power, Corruption 
and Market Manipulation” (UIF, 2016). Quoting the FBI, “Money Laundering can undermine 
the integrity and stability of financial institutions and systems, discourage foreign investment, 
and distort international capital flows”19. Economic crime and Money Laundering have dire 
consequences to society mainly reflected in two overlapping spheres: 
 
 The Economic Sphere: Perpetuates inefficiency, creates large losses and has high 
welfare costs born by tax payers; Is bad for business, competition and innovation; 
 
                                                 
19 FBI (2016); 
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 The Social Sphere: Increases insecurity and violence if associated with illicit 
substances. It Hinders social mobility. Creates a legitimacy problem for the country’s 
institutions and rule of law, which have medium to long term effects in the stability of 
regimes and societies, contributing to an overall decay of moral standards. This last 
remark was studied by Hassomer (2002), who drew a conclusive correlation between 
the loss of civil liberties and the persistence of Money Laundering. 
 
 By nature, Money Laundering cannot be easily measured. What is more easily 
measured is the size of the shadow economy. Earnings which are not taxed, need to be 
laundered. So the discrepancy between the estimates for the shadow economy and the real 
economy is the amount that is laundered. Official estimates from international organizations 
vary wildly. The FBI estimates that Money Laundering related transfers in the United States 
alone total 300$ Billion a year. The former also states that transactions are mostly undertaken 
by “third party facilitators”, namely Lawyers and Accountants20. Hence the need for stronger 
control over Legal Professionals. Michael Cambessus, Managing Director of the IMF (1987-
2000) stated in 1998 that Money Laundering was estimated to be between 2 to 5% of the 
world’s GDP (IMF 1998).  In 2009, the National Security Agency (UK) published in its 
estimate for the global value of Money Laundering at around $1.6 billion US, circa 2.7% of 
the world GDP21.  
  
 In academia two methods of estimation exist to estimate the amounts of money 
laundered: Macro and Microeconomic estimates. Macroeconomic estimates draw great 
emphasis on the work of Tanzi (1980), which compares estimated demand for cash with actual 
demand for cash in a given economy. Tanzi’s procedure paved the way for currency based 
estimates of Money Laundering. Currency estimates of Money Laundering make use of the 
difference between estimated and actual demand for currency. Schneider and Buehn (2016), 
who conducted an efficiency assessment of Macro versus Micro estimates of the shadow 
economy, make a concise summary of Tanzi’s variables: Discrepancy between National 
Expenditure and Income statistics; Official versus Actual Labour; Transaction Volume versus 
GDP; Demand for Money versus estimated Demand for Money. The last indicator is computed 
using information on tax rates, wages, salaries, personal income, interest rates and real per 
                                                 
20 FBI 24th October, 2016; 
21 NSA, 2017; 
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capita income. The methodology first proposed by Tanzi was adopted by Schneider and Enste 
(2000) and Schneider (2002) to estimate the percentage size of the shadow economy in 22 
countries22. Estimates vary between 7% and 16%, which by far exceeds the 2-5% estimate of 
the IMF.  
 
 Microeconomic estimates rely on surveys, tax auditing and compliance procedures. 
Schneider and Enste (2000) state that this estimation method suffers from selection bias, small 
sample properties and greatly underestimates the size of the shadow economy because it relies 
on willing disclosure of potentially compromising information. In Portugal, the FIU 
periodically conducts such surveys. 
 
 Regardless of estimation method, the issue of Money Laundering is not negligible. As 
mentioned before, Money Laundering usually arises from some underlying illegal activity, a 
predicate offence. Usually drug traffic and white collar crime. White collar crime tends to 
implicate: Failure of auditors and other regulators to identify or report suspicious activities; 
Complex and opaque legal arrangements between different legal entities (usually devised by 
qualified Legal Professionals) and; Unclear information about the Beneficial Ownership of 
such entities (Trusts, Non-Profit Organizations, Foundations and Off-shores). Four key failures 
which the regulators systematically try to overcome and which are accurately captured in the 
set of 9 recommendations in the Key Set: Politically Exposed Person; Transaction 
Reporting; Beneficial Ownership; Independence of Investigation.  
 
 Full compliance with these recommendations above would mean that: PEPs would be 
properly controlled; Criminal investigations would be independently conducted; Legal 
Professionals would report whenever they work with legal persons that operate in suspicious 
jurisdictions; Banks would inform whenever they make significant transfers to suspicious or 
dangerous jurisdictions and there would be severe penalties in place to punish non compliant 
behaviour. Some of these duties are performed, but not with the transparency and effectiveness 
required, as evidenced by the enormous costs that Portuguese tax payers have borne in recent 
banking failures. It is fair to conclude that legislation regarding surveillance, compliance and 
reporting is not sufficient, and even countries with high level of compliance with FATF 
standards have found themselves at hands with very costly cases of white collar crime. 
                                                 
22 see Table 3; 
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 In Portugal, white collar crime has been mentioned to play a part in the failure of the 
following banks, with the following costs to the tax payers: BPN Banco Português de 
Negócios: Between 5-9 € Billion, made of individual tranches which totalled 3,237.5 € Million 
as of 2014, an initial amount of 1,800 € Million in 2010 and a compromise to cover toxic assets 
adding up to 4,000 € Million23 (in Jornal de Negócios, 12th June 2017); BES Banco Espírito 
Santo: 3,890 € Million directly attributed to the state24; Banif: 2,189 € Million with 1,700 € 
Million directly attributed to the State 25. These numbers add to roughly 15€ Billion, circa 8% 
of the country’s GDP, not considering interest on the amounts injected into the financial 
system, which the government borrowed.  
 Abroad, other highly publicized cases of white collar crime include Madoff’s scheme, 
which inflicted losses of 1$ Billion for HSBC, 1,4$ Billion for Fortis Bank, 835$ Million for 
Pioneer Investments, 404$ Million for BBVA, 3,1 $Billion for Santander and 350$ Million for 
BNP Paribas, excluding all other investors (UIF, 2016). Societé General in France was severely 
damaged by a loss of 7,1$ Billion due to fraudulent practices 26. Enron in the US reported 
revenues of 100,789.0$ Million in 2000 before it filled for bankruptcy in 200127, taking with it 
employee pension plans and insurance schemes. In Brazil, the “Lava Jato” scandal has exposed 
the corrosive links between politicians from all major parties with business men in exchange 
for state contracts. The scandal has resulted in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff 
and the recent conviction of former President Lula da Silva. The fact that politicians from all 
major parties in Brazil were involved in private deals with business man in exchange for state 
contracts is pure evidence that white collar crime and corruption go together, free from any 
ideological bias28. Also, some regions face serious challenges to development due to unlawful 
appropriation of public funds by opaque legal structures. For instance, upon Yasser Arafat’s 
death, it surfaced that his wife Zuha Arafat was in control of a portfolio worth 1$ Billion USD, 
with interest in different industries around the world. This money was channelled from 
international relief efforts to accounts in the Cayman Islands 29. Palestine is one of many cases 
where Money Laundering damages the general welfare. The examples serve to highlight the 
                                                 
23 Jornal de Negócios, 12th June 2017; 
24 Público, 6th April, 2017; 
25 Expresso, 21st, December, 2015; 
26 UIF (2016); 
27 Fortune, 2001; 
28 Transparency International, 2017; 
29 CBS 2003 Nov 7th, November, 2003; 
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need for stronger reporting duties, specially of Legal Professionals, given that one common 
thread between most cases here mentioned is the application of complex legal entities to make 
use of legal loop-holes. 
 
 There has been a wave of regulation since the financial crisis of 2007. The 
implementation of new Anti Money Laundering regulations is a costly affair. Hubli and Geiger 
(2004) estimated the cost AML measures to total 45% of overall compliance costs in banks 
alone, for the Swiss economy, with similar costs for other high income countries. An online 
survey on the costs and benefits of AML regulation in the financial industry in the United 
Kingdom showed that a significant percentage of the 386 participants believes that Anti Money 
Laundering has only marginally increased the reputation of the sector; Is expensive but does 
not significantly damage business and has not reduced the underlying predicate offenses (City 
Research Series). Some countries receive very large numbers of SARs30 and so far, there has 
not been a link between, SARs received and the reduction in the predicate offenses, Cuellar 
(2003). This is fundamentally due to the inexistence of centralized data on SARs and 
Convictions, which have so far made impossible a full effectiveness analysis of the FATF 
recommendations. The absence of data on convictions has nonetheless failed to stop 
investigators from focusing on financial regulation. Research has focused on the need to 
regulate certain areas of business, which go hand in hand with the deficiencies detected in the 
adoption of the FATF recommendations detected in the Mutual Evaluations.  
 
 These deficiencies show themselves, as mentioned before, in the low levels of 
compliance with a Key Set of recommendations which capture issues that deserve better 
addressing: Politically Exposed Persons, Beneficial Ownership, Transaction Reporting 
and Independence of Investigation. The low compliance scores with these measures is not 
unnoticed in academia. Naheem (2015) detected an overall lack of regulation in the areas of 
Beneficial Ownership, Costumer Due Diligence Procedures, Transparency of Transactions and 
the proper accountability of the companies involved in cross border operations, with emphasis 
on low income countries. These are important issues as stronger identification duties for 
counterparties in unusual transactions and proper identification of beneficial owners are 
necessary for a healthier financial system (Balleyguier, 2003). The argument is reinforced by 
Ping He (2006) who identifies Lawyers, Notaries and Accountants as facilitators of Money 
                                                 
30 See Tables 4, 5 and 6; 
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Laundering practices through companies. Of course the issue of how Legal Professionals are 
to be regulated is not clear, as professional secrecy is a sine qua non condition of many 
activities. Nevertheless, and given that nowadays Money Laundering involves Lawyers, 
Accountants and Notaries a system must be devised to ensure proper regulation. One solution 
proposed by Ping He (2003) is the possibility to separate the professional activities of Legal 
Professionals between justice proceedings, which should allow for secrecy, and non-justice 
proceedings, namely company law activities and financial services to companies, which should 
not allow any secrecy. Ruiz (2004) goes even further suggesting that, not only should there be 
a separation between justice and non-justice proceedings, there should also be strong penalties 
in place for deviant lawyers who give advice on, and facilitate, Money Laundering. The issue 
is complicated but leaves clear the need to properly clarify the duties of Legal Professionals. 
The FATF fails to properly define them, and most countries fail to adopt them.  
  
 The issue of adoption of FATF recommendations is also complicated.  The 40 FATF 
recommendations cover many different topics and some countries, namely low income 
countries and small island nations, do not have the proper human and financial resources to 
implement so many regulations, as these need to be deviated from more pressing matters. 
(Shehu, 2010). This type of countries are also the countries where the strength of the institutions 
is weaker, and where the strength of the informal sector of the economy prevails over the 
regulated sectors, making the whole regulation process more difficult (Shehu, 2010). These 
countries are however the ones that could benefit the most from proper anti Money Laundering 
systems. Not surprisingly also is the fact that low income countries and small island nations 
have shown decreasing or stagnant levels of compliance with the FATF 40 recommendations 
since 2003 (Johnson, 2008) and that most recommendations were only superficially adopted. 
This suggests a certain impracticality of the present framework suggested by the FATF to 
prevent Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. In fact, it was noted by Tang et.al 
(2010) that compliance is stagnant after a light adoption of the FATF recommendations, and 
that therefore, there should be less recommendations. Also in favour of less recommendations 
are Jensen and Cheong-Ann (2011), stressing the need to provide case specific regulation 
directed towards particular issues in low income countries and small island nations. 
  
 Of Course, the FATF recommendations require political will to be put into practice. 
The type of political will to implement anti Money Laundering legislation is highly dependent 
on the type of government a country has and its attitude towards corruption. Sung (2004) 
 28 
studies the relationship between corruption and democracy and concluded that it is not linear, 
as in, democracy decreases corruption. In fact, newly democratized countries have higher 
corruption than decades old democracies. This is due to instability, as highlighted by Campante 
et.al (2009) whose article on political instability and corruption found a link between rent 
seeking behaviour and instability. Be it understood that instability refers to the length of 
political mandates. If politicians stay in office for shorter periods of time, they might be more 
tempted to seek rents and avoid adopting legislation that hinders their ability to do so. It is in 
this line of thought that I have included the variable Political Mandates in my thesis. This 
variable is a count of how many governments a country has had in the past 40 years (1976-
2016). I expect to find that more mandates have a negative impact on compliance with the 
FATF recommendations, and specially, with the Key Set of Recommendations, which have a 
political side to them. Not only because the regulate very specific fields, but also because those 
who have the power pass them into law are among the groups that have more to loose. 
 
 The sample for which data on SARs was available consists of the following 23 
countries: Australia, The Bahamas, Bermuda, Belgium, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Chile, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Rep. of Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Albeit 
relatively small, the sample includes a diverse set of economies and legal systems. It 
encompasses developed and developing countries, civil and common law jurisdictions, 
democracies with different maturities, constitutional monarchies and different levels of public 
perception of corruption.  
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3. Methodology 
 
 The methodology section is divided into 3 parts. In the first part there is a replication 
of the procedures of Yepes (2011) with a sample of 111 countries and observations for the 
period 2004-2008. This is followed by a second replication with a sample of 23 countries and 
a third part where the same methodology is applied to new independent variables with the 
introduction of a new explanatory variable, Political Mandates. Parts 2 and 3 refer to the period 
2006-2015. 
3.1 Data 
 
 During the evaluations that the FATF conducts at the country level, the degree of 
compliance with the recommendations is classified in the following categories with the 
following scores: N/A (Non-Applicable) for which there is no classification; NC (Non 
Compliant) with a score of 0; PC (Partially Compliant) with a score of 0,33; LC (Largely 
Compliant) with a score of 0.66 and C (Compliant) with a score of 1. As mentioned in the 
section “The FATF and the 40 Recommendations”, the recommendations are divided 
according to specific categories. Each category31 has a different number of recommendations. 
The sum of all the recommendations in every category is 40. 
 
FATF Compliance index = Legal Measures + Institutional Measures + Financial Institutions 
Prevention + DNFBPs Prevention + Informal Sector Prevention + Entity Transparency + 
International Cooperation 
 
 The index is computed as the sum of the individual compliance scores of each 
recommendation over the overall 40, for the total FATF 40 Index or over the total number of 
recommendations in each category of the FATF index components. The Key Index is computed 
in the same way: it is the sum of the compliance score with the 9 Key Recommendations over 
9. 
 The dependent variables in parts 1 and 2 are the FATF40 Index and the individual 
components of the FATF recommendations. In part3 the dependent variables are the Key Index 
of the 9 recommendations, the 9 recommendations themselves and the information pertaining 
to Suspicious Activity Reports. In Part 3 the variable Political Mandates is included to help 
                                                 
31 see the summary of the FATF 40 Recommendations in the Appendix; 
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explain the compliance scores with the FATF40 Index and the Key Index. The FATF40 Index 
and the Key Index will then become independent variables to explain the number of SARs 
received, the number of Disseminated SARs and the number of SARs submitted by Legal 
Professionals.  
 
 The dependent variables in parts 1 and 2 are indexes, which range from 0 (no 
compliance) to 100 (full compliance). They correspond to the compliance scores of: Legal 
Sector Prevention Measures, Institutional Prevention Measures, Financial Institutions 
Prevention Measures; Informal Sector Prevention Measures; Entity Transparency Enhancing 
Measures; International Cooperation Measures and Anti-Money Laundering and 
Criminalization of Terrorist Financing Measures. Table 9 displays the summary statistics for 
part 1 and Table 13 for parts 2 and 3. 
  
 In part 1 with a sample of 111 countries, compliance with the FATF40 Index in the 
period 2004-2008 is 41.5%. The categories that attained a higher compliance score as of  2007 
were International Cooperation (57.6%) and Institutional Prevention Measures (52.3%). The 
worst performing category are DNFBPs Prevention Measures (13.3%). All Legal Professionals 
are included in the DNFBPs section. In comparison with the remaining categories, DNFBPs 
remain poorly compliant. Parts 2 and 3 have a sample of 23 diverse countries with 230 
observations for the period 2006-2015. With a reduced sample, the overall compliance with 
the FATF40 Index is 49%, roughly half of the proposed regime as of 2007. The highest ranking 
scores are International Cooperation Measures (69%), Institutional Prevention Measures 
(63.7%) and Informal Sector Prevention Measures (61.54%). The category that scores the 
lowest is still DNFBPs prevention Measures (17%). Compliance with the Key Set of 9 
recommendations is 31.4%, significantly lower than the overall FATF40 Index (49%).  
 Part 3 also has the dependent variables referring to SARs. The number of SARs 
received and Disseminated varies greatly among the sample of 23 countries32 for the period 
2006-2015. The country with more SARs is the United Kingdom with 257.350 and the lowest 
belongs to Malta with just 120 on average. The countries that disseminate more SARs as 
percentage of SARs received are Japan (71.9%) and Italy (54.04%) while the country with less 
is, surprisingly, the United Kingdom (0.065%). SARs reported by Legal Professionals are 
highest in the British Virgin Islands (61.18%) and lowest in Belgium (0.02%).  
                                                 
32 See Tables 4 to 7; 
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 The independent variables capture cultural, institutional and socio-economic factors. 
The variables that capture cultural and institutional factors are:  
 
Criminalization of ML/FT (CML) comprises three issues: If the country has criminalized the 
provision of funds for terrorism (0;1); If the country has criminalized Money Laundering from 
drugs (0;1) and non drugs related activities (0;1). This variable ranges from 0 to 3. With 2.6 
and 2.8 for the 111 and 23 country sample, countries on average seem to adopt these three 
issues. 
 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) is compendium of variables that reflect how well a government is 
able to enact legislation that helps to promote private sector development. The variable ranges 
from 0 to 100, with 100 being the best classification possible for any regulatory framework and 
0 the worst. The best performing countries are Australia, Germany, Luxembourg and the UK 
with scores above 90%. The worst performing countries are India, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and 
Turkey with scores between 50% and 60%. Portugal has average scores of 70-80%. The 
average in each sample if 63% and 77%. 
 
Control for Corruption (CO) is a measure of the power of the state and institutions to prevent 
their use for private gain. A higher control for corruption would theoretically promote a more 
transparent environment. CO ranges from 0 to 100. The best and worst classified countries are 
the same as in the RQ. This variable is positively correlated with the FATF compliance index. 
The 111 country sample has lower CO (47%) as the 23 country sample (67%) on average. 
 
Membership in the FATF (FATF) is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the country 
is a member of the FATF and 0 otherwise.  
 
United Nations International Drug Index (UNDIX) is an index published by the United 
Nations which evaluates how much a country is involved in the international drug problem by 
tacking into account crime, consumption, quantities, legislation and resources spent on the drug 
problem. The index bottoms at 0 but has no ceiling as it complies information by aggregation. 
India is the highest scoring country in the sample of 23 with 52.67 and Japan the lowest with 
5.06. 
 
 32 
Year of Assessment 2007 (YoA2007) is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the country 
underwent a Mutual Evaluation by the FATF in 2007, and 0 if not. Counter intuitively, the 
variable is negatively correlated with FATF compliance in the small sample but positive in the 
23 country sample. 
 
 The Socioeconomic factors are represented by the logarithm of GDP per capita in US$ 
(LogGDP); Monetary Base 2 as percentage of GDP (M2); Trade Openness (TO); Net Interest 
Margin (NIM); Foreign Direct Investment as percentage of GDP (FDP); Banking 
Concentration (BC) and RNFSE (Ratio of Net Financial Service Exports). 
 
Logarithm of GDP per capita in US$ (LogGDP). This proxies social and economic 
development. It is positively correlated with compliance with the FATF40 Index. In Yepes 
(2011), the sample was re-organized between high and low income countries, EU and non EU 
countries. It was found that higher income countries and EU countries had better compliance 
scores than the other groups. The groups with the lowest scores were Sub-Saharan and East 
Asian countries33. Because the target sample consists of 23 very diverse countries, it is not 
possible to aggregate then in such categories. This same pattern could be found for most of the 
socio-economic variables. 
 
Monetary Base 2 as percentage of GDP (M2) is a measure of financial depth and complexity 
of an economy. The IMF’s definition of M2 is “the sum of currency outside banks; demand 
deposits other than those of the central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency 
deposits of resident sectors other than the central government; bank and traveler’s checks; and 
other securities such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper34. Of the 23 countries, the 
lowest percentage belongs to Sri Lanka with and average of circa 30% and the highest to 
Luxembourg with circa 400%.  
 
Trade Openness (TO) is the total amount of trade as percentage of GDP, meaning, total 
volume of imports and exports of any kind (financial and non financial) over GDP. The most 
open economies in the sample are Belgium and Germany. The less open economies are The 
                                                 
33 Yepes (2011); 
34 (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files, and World 
Bank and OECD GDP estimates; 
 33 
Bahamas, The British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, The Cayman Islands and Malta (off-shore 
centres). 
 
Net Interest Margin (NIM) is a measure on how the banks generate revenue (interest) from 
interest generating assets. This variable is negatively correlated with the FATF compliance 
index. The countries with the highest NIMs are Chile and Turkey (circa 4%) and Sri Lanka 
(circa 5%). The variable is negatively correlated with the FATF40 Index. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDP) is a measure of net inflows of capital into an economy as 
percentage of its GDP. The Variable is positively correlated with the FATF40 Index score. It 
averages 12.3% for the 23 countries with the highest values found among the off shore centres.  
 
Ratio of Net Service Financial Exports (RNFSE) was introduced to narrow the definition 
provided by Foreign Direct Investment. This variable was estimated according to the procedure 
proposed by Zoromé (2007) and assesses if a country’s exports of the financial sector services 
is incommensurably large in proportion with its economy. It is a numerical definition of an off-
shore. RNFSE is poorly correlated with FATF compliance. It ranges from 0% to 98% in 
Bermuda’s case. This ratio can be negative for countries with negative net financial service 
exports. 
 
Banking Concentration (BC) is a measure of how the financial sector is concentrated. It is 
the ratio of the three largest balance sheets of banks over the total banking balance sheet of a 
given country. The negative correlation between banking concentration and FATF compliance 
suggest that concentration decreases compliance. 
 
Political Mandates (Mandates) is a proxy for political stability and is the count of cabinet 
changes in the period 1976-2016. The country with less cabinet changes is Qatar, with just 5. 
The country with more cabinet changes is South Korea, with 56. The average number of 
cabinets in the 40-year period is 18 (roughly one mandate every two years). 
 
 Most Cultural and Institutional variables are positively correlated with FATF 
compliance scores in the 111 and 23 country sample except for FATF Membership and 
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UNDIX, which become negatively correlated in the reduced sample.35 The socio-economic 
variables LogGDP, FDP, TO and RNFSE are positively correlated with compliance in the 111 
country sample but RNFSE becomes negatively correlated in the small sample. NIM is always 
negatively correlated with compliance. 
 
3.2 Part 1-Replication 
 
In part 1, the FATF compliance index and its components will be regressed in a multivariate 
cross-country regression in the following specification: 
 
FATF Compliance Index36 = β0 + β1 CMLi +β2 RQi + β3 COi + β4FATF+β5 UNDIXi + β6 
M2i +β7 TOi + β8 NIMi +β9 FDPi + β10YOA2007i37+i 
 
This part refers to the period 2004-2008 and uses 111 countries. There are 4 specifications to 
explain compliance with the FATF40 Index that use different independent variables (see Table 
11). Of the cultural and institutional variables, only CML, RQ and CO yield significant 
estimates for their impact on compliance with the FATF40 index over the three specifications. 
LogGDP has a significant and positive impact on compliance for specification 1. 
In Table 12 are the results for the regressions of the FATF Index components on the full set of 
of explanatory variables following the equation: 
 
FATF Index Component = β1 LogGDP+ β2CMLi +β3RQi + β4COi + β5FATF 
+β6 UNDIXi + β7 M2i +β8TOi + β9NIMi +β10FDPi + β10 YOA2007i+i 
 
The results do not suggest any prevalence of cultural and institutional factors over socio-
economic factors and vice versa. Both groups of variables produce significant coefficients 
across the regressions on the individual components of the FATF index. Cultural and 
Institutional variables tend to have a positive impact on compliance, as well as LogGDP and 
                                                 
35 In the reduced sample of 23 countries almost all are FATF members; 
36All regressions were estimated with Heteroskedastic Robust Standard Errors; This 
specification is subject to 3 versions; 
37 This specification will suffer some changes due to robustness and data limitations (Banking 
Concentration is introduced to replace Net Interest Margin; RNFSE, Ratio of Net Financial 
Service Exports is introduced to replace, Monetary Base 2); 
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FDP. NIM has a negative impact suggesting that higher net interest margins have an adverse 
impact on compliance. 
 
 The results from this replication are slightly, but not fundamentally different, from the 
those obtained in Yepes (2011). This is due to differences in the sample of countries. I have a 
larger sample than Yepes, which only has 84 observations, because I introduced new countries 
which were relevant for my SARs analysis and I have more complete data sets for more 
countries than the original sample because of improvements in data in 2017 relative to 2011. 
The main difference is that I obtain slightly smaller coefficients. Despite that, the pattern of 
statistical significance and positive/negative signs remains largely unchanged. The correlations 
are all mostly the same with the exception of the correlation between Banking Concentration 
and the FATF40 Index38.  
 
3.3 Part 2- Replication with a reduced Sample 
 
 Part 2 refers to the period 2006-2015. The same procedure as in part 1 was applied. In 
Table 15 are the results for 3 specifications of independent variables on the FATF40 Index39. 
Again, the cultural and institutional variables CML, RQ and CO are significant across 
specifications. Reducing the sample to 23 countries makes the variable YoA2007 significant 
with an estimated positive impact on compliance, suggesting that the FATF Mutual 
Evaluations have a positive impact on compliance. This is a strong suggestion in favour of the 
power of cultural and institutional variables over compliance.  
 In the socio-economic domain, LogGDP still has a significant and positive impact. The 
variables FDP, NIM and RNFSE all have significant statistical impacts on compliance. 
However, the variables TO and M2 fail to produce significant estimates. 
Table 16 displays the results for the regressions of the individual FATF index components on 
the full set of explanatory variables. There is a very large increase in the number of statistically 
significant coefficients across all equations from cultural, institutional and socio—economic 
variables. All the adjusted R2 for the equations in Part 2 are superior to the adjusted R2 in part 
1. 
 
                                                 
38 In Yepes (2011) the correlation is positive and in my sample the correlation is negative; 
39 Variable Banking Concentration was not available for several countries in the sample; 
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3.4 Part 3- Key Index and SARs Analysis 
 
 This section is the core of the analysis. Table 17 shows the results for the same 
procedure as in part 1 and 2 but with a different dependent variable. Here the dependent 
variable is the Key Index. Specification 3 of table 17 has the highest adjusted R2 with all 
coefficients, except for CML and CO (previously very solid), significant at conventional 
confidence levels. The variables RNFSE and UNDIX become significant in all specifications 
as opposed to the previous models. When the compliance score of each of the 9 
recommendations is regressed on the full set of independent variables the evidence becomes 
clear that these cultural, institutional and socio-economic variables are significantly tied to how 
countries adopt the 9 Key recommendations40. The number of significant coefficients here far 
outnumbers the number of significant coefficients when the dependent variables were the 
FATF 40 Index and its individual components. 
Table 19 shows how cultural, institutional and socio economic factors impact the overall 
FATF40 Index and the Key Index when the variable Political Mandates is introduced: 
 
Key Set Compliance Index = β0 + β1 CMLi +β2 RQi + β3 COi + β4FATF +β5UNDIXi + 
β6M2i +β7TOi + β8 NIMi +β9FDPi + β10YoA2007i  +β11Mandatesi +i 
 
  Political Mandates is significant at 99% confidence level for the regression on the Key 
Index, with an estimated negative impact and insignificant for the regression on the FATF40 
Index. This suggests that, the FATF 40 index is too broad to be influenced by political stability 
and that the Key Index is heavily influenced by political stability, which greatly increases rent 
seeking behaviour, resulting in an overall lack of will to implement the 9 recommendations 
which target: Politically Exposed Persons, Beneficial Ownership, Transaction Reporting 
and Independence of Investigation. 
 
 In Table 20 we finally see the estimated impact of compliance with the FATF 
framework impacts SARs. I regress the three forms of SARs (Total Number of SARs; 
Disseminated SARs in % of Total and SARs by Legal Professionals) on the FATF40 Index 
and the Key Index.  This a relevant step forward. In Yepes’ words “the entire assessment 
apparatus (of the FATF framework) suffers from lack of data (…) for example on the 
                                                 
40 see Table 18; 
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correlation between SARs, investigations and crimes (and the FATF recommendations)”. I 
have manually collected data on SARs from 189 official reports and I am able to establish a 
link between the FATF framework and the first stages of criminal investigations. The reports, 
albeit similar in content, are far from being standardized. So far there has been no study on the 
impact of compliance with the FATF regime and Suspicious Activity Reports. The estimated 
impact of indexes on the 3 categories of SARs is statistically significant at 99% confidence 
level, with positive estimated impacts. The Key Index, which refers to the above mentioned, 
and crucial, issues, has a stronger estimated impact than the FATF40 Index. This reinforces the 
importance of full compliance with the key 9 recommendations I have isolated, which have 
low compliance scores across all countries and whose evidence suggests, have a practical 
impact on the initial stages of criminal investigations. 
 
4. Findings 
 
1) Compliance with the FATF recommendations is on average 49% out of 100% for the 
23 countries in the sample versus 47% in the 116 country sample of Yepes (2011); 
2) The recommendations with the lowest compliance scores target DNFBPs Prevention 
Measures (where Legal Professionals are included); 
3) The regressions of the cultural and institutional  and the socio-economic factors on the 
FATF40 Index and its components for the 23 country sample over the time period 2006-
2015 in part 2 all have higher adjusted R2 than their counterparts in part 1 with a 111 
country sample over the period 2004-2008; 
4) To proxy the impact of political instability on compliance across countries, the variable 
Political Mandates was introduced. The evidence shows that less mandates, i.e., more 
political stability, lead to higher compliance scores with the Key Recommendations. 
Political stability frees resources else spent on managing the political cycle in favour of 
constructive policies. Therefore, it fosters a healthier attitude, among other things, 
towards compliance. The fact that the variable Political Mandates is significant in 
explaining compliance with the Key Index at a 99% confidence level, but not significant 
in explaining compliance with the general FATF40 Index is evidence that the low 
compliance with the Key Set of regulations is, in part, a political phenomenon. When 
the variable Political Mandates is included, only GDP and NIM have any explanatory 
power on compliance, among all the socio-economic variables. The variables CML and 
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RQ are however very significant. Overall, compliance with the Key Set is more related 
to cultural and institutional factors than to socio-economic factors;  
5) SARs, Disseminated SARs and SARs submitted by Legal Professionals are all 
statistically significantly related to the compliance scores with the FATF and the Key 
Index. There is a quantifiable link between the institutional framework suggested by 
the FATF and the practical side of Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
efforts; 
6) Compliance with the Key Set of Recommendations seems to have a stronger practical 
impact on the number of SARs fillings, Disseminated SARs and SARs fillings by Legal 
Professionals than the FATF40 Index altogether. This reinforces the initial intuition 
that the recommendations included in the Key Set are more important in practical terms 
than the 40 recommendations. As such, the FATF recommendations and subsequent 
assessments should be devised on a case specific rather than on a one size fits all basis. 
 
 
 
 
5. Caveats 
 
The information on SARs was obtained from the Annual Reports of the FIUs of the 23 
countries in the sample. Therefore, the sample was determined by the availability of 
information. Given that this availability is a product of the FIUs will to publish the reports, the 
sample is not random. 
 
Some topics in the FATF regime regarding Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing are 
spread among more than one recommendation. This renders individual evaluation of 
compliance with the preventive measures on certain subject difficult to evaluate independently. 
As such, the compliance score can work only as a proxy in some cases. 
 
Countries submit themselves willingly to the Mutual Evaluations of the FATF. This might cast 
some doubt on the validity of the YOA2007 variable, as it becomes fair to think that only 
countries who expect a good evaluation might submit themselves to one. 
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The Cultural and Institutional variables might prove to be inaccurate proxies for differences 
across countries. Most of these variables are indexes which compile into one number 
information on legislation, crime, the characteristics of such crimes and the legal attitude 
towards them. The FATF Compliance Index follows this approach as well. 
 
The inexistence of a centralized data base for SARs and convictions renders impossible a full 
assessment of the efficacy of the FATF 40 recommendations. 
  
The inexistence of a data base on the direct costs of implementing the FATF 40 
recommendations render impossible a full cost benefit analysis. 
 
6. Executive Summary 
 
 The set of cultural, institutional and socio-economic variables provide a good fit for all 
the regressions on the dependent variables. The dependent variables under analysis were the 
FATF compliance index with the 40 FATF recommendations, the individual thematic 
components of the FATF recommendations (Legal Measures, Institutional Measures, 
Prevention in Financial Institutions Measure, Prevention in the Informal Sector Measures, 
Entity Transparency Measures, International Cooperation Measures and Anti-Money 
Laundering and Criminalization of Terrorist Financing), the compliance index with the 9 
recommendations I have isolated and the 9 recommendations themselves (recommendations 
10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24 and 28). These 9 recommendations cover the topics of: Politically 
Exposed Persons, Beneficial Ownership, Transaction Reporting and Independence of 
Investigation. 
 When I regress the set of cultural, institutional and socio-economic variables on the 
compliance index of 9 recommendations, and the 9 recommendations individually, I find more 
statistically significant coefficients than when the dependent variables are the FATF 
compliance index and the thematic components. The evidence suggests that the explanatory 
variables intended to proxy cultural, institutional and socio-economic differences across 
countries, capture better the differences in attitude towards Politically Exposed Persons, 
Beneficial Ownership, Transaction Reporting and Independence of Investigation than the 
difference in attitude with the vast number of topics included in the FATF 40 
recommendations. 
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 The new variable, Political Mandates, which is a count of the number of cabinet 
changes between 1976-2016, is significant in explaining compliance with the restricted set of 
9 recommendations, but not with the total set of 40 recommendations. The estimated impact 
on compliance with the 9 recommendations was negative, reinforcing the notion that political 
stability is paramount to the proper development of institutional and legal frameworks to fight 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. 
 The evidence suggests that compliance with both indexes (the total index of 40 
recommendations, and the restricted index of 9 recommendations), have significant positive 
estimated impacts on the number of Suspicious Activity Reports, Disseminated Suspicious 
Activity Reports for criminal investigation, and Suspicious Activity Reports submitted by 
Legal Professionals. The estimated impact of the of the 9 recommendations on the number of 
reports was greater than the impact of the 40 recommendations. The findings strengthen the 
argument that some recommendations are more important than others, in practical terms, and 
that the FATF presently covers too many topics at once, hence justifying calls for case specific 
regulations instead of the present uniform approach to the fight against Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing. In other words, these 9 recommendations seem to have a practical impact 
on the workings of the Criminal Police, namely in the early stages of criminal investigations 
suggesting that a more focalized approach to compliance could provide efficiency gains. 
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Rapporto annuale per il 2009, n.2 - anno 2010. 
Rapporto annuale per il 2010, n.3 - anno 2011. 
Rapporto annuale per il 2011, n.4 - anno 2012. 
Rapporto annuale per il 2012, n.5 - anno 2013. 
Rapporto annuale per il 2013, n.6 - anno 2014. 
Rapporto annuale per il 2014, n.7 - anno 2015. 
Rapporto annuale per il 2015, n.8 - anno 2016. 
 
Japan 
JAFIC, Japanese Financial Intelligence Center Annual Reports under: 
http://www.npa.go.jp/sosikihanzai/jafic/en/nenzihokokue/nenzihokokue.htm. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2007. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2008. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2009. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2010. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2011. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2012. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2013. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2014. 
JAFIC Annual Report, 2015. 
 
Latvia 
Latvian Financial and Capital Market Commission: 
 http://www.fktk.lv/en/publications/press-releases/3984-2015-02-18-joint-statement-of-
financial-and-capital-market-commission-fcmc-and-control-service-latvian-financia.html. 
 
 50 
Lebanon 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Unit Reports under: 
 http://www.sic.gov.lb/reports.shtml. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2006. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2007. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2008. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2009. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2010. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2011. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2012. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2013. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2014. 
Lebanese Financial Intelligence Annual Report, 2015. 
 
Luxembourg 
Annual Reports under: 
 http://www.justice.public.lu/fr/publications/index.html 
Rapport d'activité Justice 2006. 
Rapport d'activité Justice 2007. 
Rapport d'activité Justice 2008. 
Rapports juridictions judiciaires 2010.  
Rapports juridictions judiciaires 2011. 
Rapports juridictions judiciaires 2012. 
Rapports juridictions judiciaires 2013. 
Rapports juridictions judiciaires 2014. 
Rapports juridictions judiciaires 2015. 
 
Malta 
Annual Reports under:  
http://www.fiumalta.org/annual-reports 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2006. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2007. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2008. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2009. 
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Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2010. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2011. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2012. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2013. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2014. 
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Annual Report, 2015. 
 
Portugal 
Unidade de Informação Financeira Annual Reports under: 
https://www.policiajudiciaria.pt/PortalWeb/page/%7BE6E29429-8228-44A5-8338-
9A3F3BCC3986%7D. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2006. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2007. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2008. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2009. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2010. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2011. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2012. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2013. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2014. 
Unidade de Informação Financeira, Relatório Anual, 2015. 
 
Qatar 
Financial Intelligence Unit Annual Reports Available under:  
http://www.qfiu.gov.qa/reports/. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2007. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2008. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2009. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2010. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2011. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2012. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2013. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2014. 
Qatar Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2015. 
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Republic of Korea 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit Annual Reports under:  
http://www.kofiu.go.kr/eng/sub1/1.jsp. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2006. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2007. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2008. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2009. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2010. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2011. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2012. 
Korean Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 2013. 
 
Sri Lanka 
Sri Lankan FIU Reports under: 
http://fiusrilanka.gov.lk/publications.html. 
Financial Intelligence Unit of Sri Lanka Annual Reports, 2011. 
Financial Intelligence Unit of Sri Lanka, Annual Report, 2012. 
Financial Intelligence Unit of Sri Lanka, Annual Report, 2013. 
Financial Intelligence Unit of Sri Lanka, Annual Report, 2014. 
Financial Intelligence Unit of Sri Lanka, Annual Report, 2015. 
 
Turkey 
Turkish Annual Reports available under:  
http://www.masak.gov.tr/en/content/activity-reports/151. 
Activity Report 2010, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Finance, MASAK. 
Activity Report 2011, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Finance, MASAK. 
Activity Report 2012, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Finance, MASAK. 
Activity Report 2013, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Finance, MASAK. 
Activity Report 2014, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Finance, MASAK. 
Activity Report 2015, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Finance, MASAK. 
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United Kingdom 
National Crime Agency, NCA, SAR Reports under: 
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/suspicious-activity-reports-sars. 
SARs Annual Report 2010. 
SARs Annual Report 2011. 
SARs Annual Report 2012. 
SARs Annual Report 2013. 
SARs Annual Report 2014. 
SARs Annual Report 2015. 
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8. Appendix 1 
 
The FATF 40 Recommendations 
New/Old Number  
A – AML/CFT POLICIES AND COORDINATION 
1 - Assessing risks & applying a risk-based approach 
2 R.31 National cooperation and coordination 
B – MONEY LAUNDERING AND CONFISCATION 
3 R.1 & R.2 Money Laundering offence 
4 R.3 Confiscation and provisional measures 
C – TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION 
5 SRII Terrorist financing offence 
6 SRIII 
Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & 
terrorist financing 
7   Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation 
8 SRVIII Non-profit organizations 
D – PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
9 R.4 Financial institution secrecy laws 
Customer due diligence and record keeping 
10 R.5 Customer due diligence 
11 R.10 Record keeping 
Additional measures for specific customers and activities 
12 R.6 Politically exposed persons 
13 R.7 Correspondent banking 
14 SRVI Money or value transfer services 
15 R.8 New technologies 
16 SRVII Wire transfers 
Reliance, Controls and Financial Groups 
17 R.9 Reliance on third parties 
18 R.15 & R.22 Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries 
19 R.21 Higher-risk countries 
Reporting of suspicious transactions 
20 R.13 & SRIV Reporting of suspicious transactions 
21 R.14 Tipping-off and confidentiality 
Designated non-financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) 
22 R.12 DNFBPs: Customer due diligence 
23 R.16 DNFBPs: Other measures 
E – TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL 
PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS 
24 R.33 Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons 
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25 R.34 
Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal 
arrangements 
F – POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES 
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL 
Regulation and Supervision 
26 R.23 Regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
27 R.29 Powers of supervisors 
28 R.24 Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs 
Operational and Law Enforcement 
29 R.26 Financial intelligence units 
30 R.27 
Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative 
authorities 
31 R.28 Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities 
32 SRIX Cash couriers  
General Requirements 
33 R.32 Statistics 
34 R.25 Guidance and feedback 
Sanctions 
35 R.17 Sanctions 
G – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
36 R.35 & SRI International instruments 
37 R.36 & SRV Mutual legal assistance 
38 R.38 Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation 
39 R.39 Extradition 
40 R.40 Other forms of international cooperation 
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations; pp.4-5; 
1. The ‘old number’ column refers to the corresponding 2003 FATF Recommendation. 
Version as adopted on 15 February 2012. 
 
 
9. Appendix 2 
 
Key Set of Recommendations: Integral text from the FATF 40 Recommendations 
Recommendation 10. Customer due diligence *  
Financial institutions should be prohibited from keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious 
names. Financial institutions should be required to undertake customer due diligence (CDD) measures when:  
(i) establishing business relations; (ii) carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated 
threshold (USD/EUR 15,000); or (ii) that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretive Note 
to Recommendation 16; (iii) there is a suspicion of Money Laundering or terrorist financing; or  
(iv) the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
identification data.  The principle that financial institutions should conduct CDD should be set out in law. Each 
country may determine how it imposes specific CDD obligations, either through law or enforceable means. The 
CDD measures to be taken are as follows: (a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity 
using reliable, independent source documents, data or information. (b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking 
reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner, such that the financial institution is satisfied 
that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal persons and arrangements this should include financial 
institutions understanding the ownership and control structure of the customer.  
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(c) Understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business 
relationship. (d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions 
undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent 
with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the 
source of funds. Financial institutions should be required to apply each of the CDD measures under (a) to (d) 
above, but should determine the extent of such measures using a risk-based approach (RBA) in accordance with 
the Interpretive Notes to this Recommendation and to Recommendation 1. Financial institutions should be 
required to verify the identity of the customer and beneficial owner before or during the course of establishing a 
business relationship or conducting transactions for occasional customers. Countries may permit financial 
institutions to complete the verification as soon as reasonably practicable following the establishment of the 
relationship, where the Money Laundering and terrorist financing risks are effectively managed and where this is 
essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business. Where the financial institution is unable to comply with 
the applicable requirements under paragraphs (a) to (d) above (subject to appropriate modification of the extent 
of the measures on a risk-based approach), it should be required not to open the account, commence business 
relations or perform the transaction; or should be required to terminate the business relationship; and should 
consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the customer. These requirements should apply to 
all new customers, although financial institutions should also apply this Recommendation to existing customers 
on the basis of materiality and risk, and should conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate 
times. 
 
Recommendation 12. Politically exposed persons   
Financial institutions should be required, in relation to foreign politically exposed persons (PEPs) (whether as 
customer or beneficial owner), in addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures, to:  
(a) have appropriate risk-management systems to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner is a 
politically exposed person; (b) obtain senior management approval for establishing (or continuing, for existing 
customers) such business relationships; (c) take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source 
of funds; and (d) conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.  
Financial institutions should be required to take reasonable measures to determine whether a customer or 
beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or a person who is or has been entrusted with a prominent function by an 
international organisation. In cases of a higher risk business relationship with such persons, financial institutions 
should be required to apply the measures referred to in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d).  
The requirements for all types of PEP should also apply to family members or close associates of such PEPs. 
 
Recommendation 14. Money or value transfer services   
Countries should take measures to ensure that natural or legal persons that provide money or value transfer 
services (MVTS) are licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring 
compliance with the relevant measures called for in the FATF Recommendations. Countries should take action to 
identify natural or legal persons that carry out MVTS without a license or registration, and to apply appropriate 
sanctions. Any natural or legal person working as an agent should also be licensed or registered by a competent 
authority, or the MVTS provider should maintain a current list of its agents accessible by competent authorities 
in the countries in which the MVTS provider and its agents operate. Countries should take measures to ensure 
that MVTS providers that use agents include them in their AML/CFT programmes and monitor them for 
compliance with these programes. 
 
Recommendation 16. Wire transfers   
Countries should ensure that financial institutions include required and accurate originator information, and 
required beneficiary information, on wire transfers and related messages, and that the information remains with 
the wire transfer or related message throughout the payment chain. Countries should ensure that financial 
institutions monitor wire transfers for the purpose of detecting those which lack required originator and/or 
beneficiary information, and take appropriate measures. Countries should ensure that, in the context of processing 
wire transfers, financial institutions take freezing action and should prohibit conducting transactions with 
designated persons and entities, as per the obligations set out in the relevant United Nations Security Council 
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resolutions, such as resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor resolutions, and resolution 1373(2001), relating to 
the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing. 
 
Recommendation 20. Reporting of suspicious transactions   
If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal 
activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the 
financial intelligence unit (FIU). 
 
Recommendation 22. DNFBPs: customer due diligence  
The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17, 
apply to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) in the following situations:  
(a) Casinos – when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above the applicable designated 
threshold. (b) Real estate agents – when they are involved in transactions for their client concerning the buying 
and selling of real estate. (c) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones – when they engage in any 
cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated threshold.  
(d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent Legal Professionals and accountants – when they prepare for or carry 
out transactions for their client concerning the following activities: buying and selling of real estate; managing of 
client money, securities or other assets; management of bank, savings or securities accounts; organisation of 
contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies; creation, operation or management of legal 
persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities. (e) Trust and company service providers – 
when they prepare for or carry out transactions for a client concerning the following activities: acting as a 
formation agent of legal persons; acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a 
company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons; providing a registered 
office, business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a company, a 
partnership or any other legal person or arrangement; acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee 
of an express trust or performing the equivalent function for another form of legal arrangement; acting as (or 
arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person.  
 
Recommendation 23. DNFBPs: Other measures   
The requirements set out in Recommendations 18 to 21 apply to all designated non-financial businesses and 
professions, subject to the following qualifications: (a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent Legal Professionals 
and accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage 
in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d) of Recommendation 22. Countries 
are strongly encouraged to extend the reporting requirement to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, 
including auditing. (b) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones should be required to report 
suspicious transactions when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable 
designated threshold. (c) Trust and company service providers should be required to report suspicious transactions 
for a client when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a transaction in relation to the activities referred to 
in paragraph (e) of Recommendation 22. 
 
Recommendation 24. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons   
Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons for Money Laundering or terrorist 
financing. Countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial 
ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent 
authorities. In particular, countries that have legal persons that are able to issue bearer shares or bearer share 
warrants, or which allow nominee shareholders or nominee directors, should take effective measures to ensure 
that they are not misused for Money Laundering or terrorist financing. Countries should consider measures to 
facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information by financial institutions and DNFBPs 
undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendations 10 and 22. 
 
Recommendation 28. Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs   
Designated non-financial businesses and professions should be subject to regulatory and supervisory measures as 
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set out below. (a) Casinos should be subject to a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory regime that ensures 
that they have effectively implemented the necessary AML/CFT measures. At a minimum: casinos should be 
licensed;competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their 
associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner of, a significant or controlling interest, holding a 
management function in, or being an operator of, a casino; and competent authorities should ensure that casinos 
are effectively supervised for compliance with AML/CFT requirements. (b) Countries should ensure that the other 
categories of DNFBPs are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with AML/CFT 
requirements. This should be performed on a risk-sensitive basis. This may be performed by (a) a supervisor or 
(b) by an appropriate self-regulatory body (SRB), provided that such a body can ensure that its members comply 
with their obligations to combat Money Laundering and terrorist financing.  
The supervisor or SRB should also (a) take the necessary measures to prevent criminals or their associates from 
being professionally accredited, or holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or 
holding a management function, e.g. through evaluating persons on the basis of a “fit and proper” test; and (b) 
have effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in line with Recommendation 35 available to deal with 
failure to comply with AML/CFT requirements.  
 
Recommendation 29. Financial intelligence units   
Countries should establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that serves as a national Centre for the receipt and 
analysis of: (a) suspicious transaction reports; and (b) other information relevant to money laundering, associated 
predicate offences and terrorist financing, and for the dissemination of the results of that analysis. The FIU should 
be able to obtain additional information from reporting entities, and should have access on a timely basis to the 
financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to undertake its functions properly. 
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10. Appendix 3: 
 
Table 1: FATF Subject Entities 
 
FATF Subject Entities 
Financial Subject Entities 
Supervisory Financial Entities 
Credit Institutions 
Financial Intermediaries 
Insurance Brokers 
Payment Services 
Post Payment Services and Remittances 
Central Banks 
Financial Securities Commissions 
Money Exchangers 
Designated Non Financial Business 
Professionals 
Precious Goods Dealers 
State Endorsed Lotteries 
Registers 
Notaries 
Gaming Inspections and Regulations Bodies 
Real Estate and Construction Supervisors 
Food Safety Authorities 
Tax and Costumes Authorities 
Auction Houses 
Legal Professionals 
 
Source: FATF 
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Table 2: Financial Intelligence Units, an Overview, IMF 2004 
 
FIU TYPES 
Administrative 
Law 
Enforcement 
(Police Type) 
Judicial or 
prosecutorial 
“Hybrid” 
Andorra Austria Cyprus Denmark 
Aruba Estonia Luxembourg Norway 
Australia Germany   
Belgium Guernsey   
Bolivia Hungary   
Bulgaria Iceland   
Canada Ireland   
Colombia Jersey   
Croatia Slovakia   
Czech Republic Sweden   
France United Kingdom   
Israel Portugal   
South Korea    
Liechtenstein    
Malta    
Monaco    
The Netherlands    
The Neth. 
Antilles    
Panama    
Poland    
Romania    
Russia    
Slovenia    
Spain    
Ukraine    
United States¨    
Venezuela    
Source: Financial Intelligence Units, an Overview, IMF 2004 
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Table 3: Size of the Shadow Economy as % of GDP using: 
 
 
  
Physical 
Input 
(Electricity 
Method 
1990) 
Currency 
Demand 
Method 
(Schneider 
Figures 
avg.1989-
90) 
Currency 
Demand 
Method 
(Schneider 
Figures 
avg. 1990-
93) 
Currency 
Demand 
Method ( 
Johnson et. 
Al Figures 
1990-93) 
 
 
Country 
Australia 15.3 10.1 13 13.1 
Austria 15.2 5.1 6.1 5.8 
Belgium 19.8 19.3 10.8 15.3 
Canada 11.7 12.8 13.5 10 
Denmark 16.9 10.8 15 9.4 
Finland 13.3    
France 12.3 9 13.8 10.4 
Germany 14.6 11.8 12.5 10.5 
Great 
Britain 
13.1 9.6 11.2 7.2 
Greece 21.8   27.2 
Ireland 20.6 11 14.2 7.8 
Italy 19.6 22.8 24 20.4 
Japan 13.2   8.5 
Netherlands 13.4 11.9 12.7 11.8 
New Zealand 9.2 9 9 
Norway 9.3 14.8 16.7 5.9 
Portugal 16.8   15.6 
Spain 22.9 16.1 17.3 16.1 
Sweden 11 15.8 17 10.6 
Switzerland 10.2 6.7 6.9 6.9 
USA 10.5 6.7 8.2 13.9 
Average 15.08 11.97 13.05 11.77 
Sources: Physical input method, Lackó (1996, 1997, 1998,1998a), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1998a,b), and Williams and Windebank (1995). 1 Calculated using the MIMIC method and currency demand 
approach. Source Giles (1999b). 
2 Calculated from Ignacio Mauleon (1998). 
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Table 4: Suspicious Activity Reports 
Country Name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
                        
Australia 17212 24801  29089 32449 47386 44775 48155 4062 47386 32812.77 
Bahamas, The 203 125 129 138 142 183 167 70 205 297 165.9 
Belgium  12830 15554 7170 8673 20001 21000 22960 27767  16994.37 
Bermuda   195 565 249 278 415 386 362  350 
British Virgin Islands 102 104 153 227 191 153 135 168   154.12 
Cayman Islands 221 219 247 320 358 353 406 392 558 568 364.2 
Chile 53 153 270 419 478 790 829 179 1127 1721 601.9 
Estonia 2601 5272 13861 16999 13655 13536 12157 11224 11204 8204 10871.3 
France 12047 12481 14565 17315 19208 22856 27237 28938 38419 45266 23833.2 
Germany 10244 10356 9472 9294 9632 8413 7973 9155 8700 8675 9191.4 
India  817 1916 4409 10067 20698 31317 31729 61953  20363.25 
Italy 9601 11987 12380 23403 36824 30596 60078 92415 75857 84627 43776.8 
Japan 113860 158041 235260 272325 294305 337341 364366 349361 377513 349508 285188 
Korea, Rep. 24149 52474 92093 136282 236068 389436 290241    174391.85 
Latvia 27479 34346 36418 20786 16407 18405 18721 17168 17041  22974.55 
Lebanon 185 234 226 202 245 335 289 301 277 432 272.6 
Luxembourg 754 811 1008 1587 5171 8681 11423 4891 7238 11023 5258.7 
Malta 82 78 70 66 63 102 120 143 202 281 120.7 
Portugal 16480 12974 22733 15199 10623 9728 5812 7554 9107 10139 12034.9 
Qatar  147 74 96 227 210 248 313 516 702 281.44 
Sri Lanka 24 37 89 111 246 185 103 366 718 783 266.2 
Turkey 1140 2946 4924 9823 10521 8739 15318 25592 36483 74221 18970.7 
United Kingdom     210524 228834 240582 247601 78665 316527 354186 381882 257350.12 
Source: National FIU’s Annual Reports 
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Table 5: Disseminated Suspicious Activity Reports 
Country Name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
                        
Australia 1800 2963 2638 3072 3096 2422 3092 2910 3924 4414 3033.1 
Bahamas, The 42 22 32 54 53 53 16 33 17 21 34.3 
Belgium  1166 937 1020 1259 1345 1502 1168   1199.57 
Bermuda   11 51 66 82 102 184 116  87.42 
British Virgin Islands 2 0 6 2 12 13 15 15   8.125 
Cayman Islands 101.66 117 129 133 136 154 144 157 189 98 135.86 
Chile 25 281 340 446 374 384 357 56 42 55 236 
Estonia 43 48 17 39 55 83 47 12 33 12 38.9 
France 411 410 359 384 404 495 522 1326 1395 1635 734.1 
Germany 325 289 289 283 329 288 274 282 277 264 290 
India  428 935 2270 6571 13744 23689 13854 15288  9597.37 
Italy 473 213  14184 23403 18117 53109 64601 71758 82428 36476.22 
Japan 71241 98629 146330 189749 208650 234836 256062 256062 306547 338375 210648.1 
Korea, Rep. 2267 2331 5234 7711 11868 13110 22173    9242 
Latvia 155 146 151 143 270 442 258 259 310  237.11 
Lebanon 70 137 134 77 119 157 116 137 132 157 123.6 
Luxembourg 255 343 255 429 501 528 600 522 1285 567 528.5 
Malta 10 13 3 13 8 11 17 11 12 36 13.4 
Portugal 584 724 568 634 703 684 745 954 1101 1248 794.5 
Qatar  29 46 32 39 75 182 131 89 292 101.66 
Sri Lanka 5 18 30 18 44 65 56 73 189 426 92.4 
Turkey 68 112 201 76 73 369 430 401 477 403 261 
United Kingdom     13223 13618 14334 13662 12915 14103 14155 14672 13835.25 
 
Source: National FIU’s Annual Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
Table 6: Disseminated Suspicious Activity Reports in percentage of Suspicious Activity Reports received 
 
Country Name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
                        
Australia 10.46 11.95  10.56 9.54 5.11 6.91 6.04 9.66 9.31 8.84 
Bahamas, The 20.69 17.60 24.81 39.13 37.32 28.96 9.58 47.14 8.29 7.07 24.06 
Belgium  0.0909 0.0602 0.1423 0.1452 0.0672 0.0715 0.0509 0  0.078 
Bermuda   0.0564 0.0903 0.2651 0.295 0.2458 0.4767 0.3204  0.249 
British Virgin Islands 1.96 0.00 3.92 0.88 6.28 8.50 11.11 8.93   5.20 
Cayman Islands 46.00 53.42 52.23 41.56 37.99 43.63 35.47 40.05 33.87 17.25 40.15 
Chile 47.17 18.37 12.59 10.64 78.24 48.61 43.06 31.28 3.73 3.20 29.69 
Estonia 1.65 0.91 0.12 0.23 0.40 0.61 0.39 0.11 0.29 0.15 0.49 
France 3.41 3.28 2.46 2.22 2.10 2.17 1.92 4.58 3.63 3.61 2.94 
Germany 3.17 2.79 3.05 3.04 3.42 3.42 3.44 3.08 3.18 3.04 3.16 
India  0.5239 0.488 0.5149 0.6527 0.664 0.7564 0.4366 0.2468  0.53 
Italy 4.93 1.78 0.00 60.61 63.55 59.21 88.40 69.90 94.60 97.40 54.04 
Japan 62.57 62.41 62.20 69.68 70.90 69.61 70.28 73.29 81.20 96.81 71.90 
Korea, Rep. 9.39 4.44 5.68 5.66 5.03 3.37 7.64    5.89 
Latvia 0.56 0.43 0.41 0.69 1.65 2.40 1.38 1.51 1.82  1.21 
Lebanon 37.84 58.55 59.29 38.12 48.57 46.87 40.14 45.51 47.65 36.34 45.89 
Luxembourg 33.82 42.29 25.30 27.03 9.69 6.08 5.25 10.67 17.75 5.14 18.30 
Malta 12.20 16.67 4.29 19.70 12.70 10.78 14.17 7.69 5.94 12.81 11.70 
Portugal 3.54 5.58 2.50 4.17 6.62 7.03 12.82 12.63 12.09 12.31 7.93 
Qatar  0.1973 0.6216 0.3333 0.1718 0.3571 0.7339 0.4185 0.1725 0.416 0.380 
Sri Lanka 20.83 48.65 33.71 16.22 17.89 35.14 54.37 19.95 26.32 54.41 32.75 
Turkey 5.96 3.80 4.08 0.77 0.69 4.22 2.81 1.57 1.31 0.54 2.58 
United Kingdom     0.0628 0.0595 0.0596 0.0552 0.1642 0.0446 0.04 0.0384 0.065 
Notes: Computed from information on national FIU’s Annual Reports 
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Table 7: Suspicious Activity Reports Submitted by Legal Professionals in percentage of Suspicious Activity Reports received 
 
Country Name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
                        
Australia  0.0367 0.0161 0.0039 0.0784 0.0253 0.0222 0.0603 0.0312  0.03 
Bahamas, The 6.50 2.40 0.00 2.16 6.31 12.57 4.77 5.92 8.30 11.78 6.07 
Belgium    0.0174 0.0112 0.0186 0.0133 0.0173 0.017  0.02 
Bermuda   0.1 0.057 0.07 0.037 0.04 0.04  0.0249 0.05 
British Virgin Islands 84.31 67.74 43.82 70.16 51.63 43.48 67.09    61.18 
Cayman Islands 17.19 17.35 15.38 11.88 10.61 10.76 9.36    13.22 
Chile 1.45 1.43 3.78 7.47 14.23 7.96 5.59 8.02 21.10 16.25 8.73 
Estonia 6.00 1.95 1.71 4.30 4.00 2.47 8.00 2.09 1.79 2.71 3.50 
France 17.60 3.87 2.62 2.48 5.00 4.04 4.07 3.85 3.11 14.53 6.12 
Germany 0.24 0.26 0.52 0.41 1.19 0.93 1.11 1.03 1.13 0.94 0.78 
India  0.3 0.2323 0.1683 0.1011 0.1 0.0529 0.0689 0.0258  0.13 
Italy 2.57 1.79 1.40 0.58 0.61 1.61 2.48 2.15 1.51 2.20 1.69 
Japan 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Korea, Rep. 1.53 1.66 1.90 3.34 3.95 10.13 10.09    4.66 
Latvia 1.74 13.01 7.95 6.29 1.48 3.39 4.26 1.89 1.94  4.66 
Lebanon 1.62 1.17 0.40 1.60 3.80 3.70 1.10 0.90 2.60 1.00 1.79 
Luxembourg 2.12 1.97 1.59 1.01 0.31 0.18 0.14 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.80 
Malta  0.11 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.132 0.11 
Portugal 0.30 0.38 0.22 0.32 0.46 0.50 0.84 0.65 0.54 0.48 0.42 
Qatar  0.135 0.125 0.2188 0.1013 0.1857 0.03 0.03 0 0.01 0.09 
Sri Lanka 4.17 2.70 8.99 3.60 1.22 1.62 1.48 1.64 2.65 2.30 3.04 
Turkey 41.23 15.95 9.55 4.78 4.47 5.38 3.07 1.84 1.29 0.63 8.82 
United Kingdom         0.0717 0.0928 0.096 0.0423 0.0246 0.0224 0.06 
 
Source: National FIU’s Annual Reports.  
Notes: Computed from information on national FIU’s Annual Reports  
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Table 8: FATF Compliance Scores 
 
Ratings of 
Compliance with 
FATF 
Recommendations 
CODE 
Score, 
Yepes 2011* 
Description 
Compliant C  1 The Recommendation is fully observed with respect to all essential criteria. 
Largely Compliant LC  0.66 
There are only minor shortcomings, with a large majority of the essential 
criteria being fully met. 
Partially 
Compliant 
PC  0.33 
There are only minor shortcomings, with a large majority of the essential 
criteria being fully met. 
Non-Compliant  NC  0 
There are only minor shortcomings, with a large majority of the essential 
criteria being fully met. 
Non-Applicable NA - 
A requirement or part of a requirement does not apply, due to the structural, 
legal or institutional features of a country e.g. a particular type of financial 
institution does not exist in that country. 
 
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations; Methodology. * Scores computed in Yepes, 2011 
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List of Variables Abbreviations 
Dependent Variables* 
Legal Prevention Measures Legal 
Institutional Prevention Measures Institutional 
Financial Prevention Measures Financial 
DNFBPs Prevention Measures DNFBPs 
Informal Sector Prevention Measures Informal Sector 
Entity Transparency Measures Entity Transparency 
International Cooperation Measures 
International 
Cooperation 
FATF40 Index FATF40 
Independent Variables 
Year of Assessment 2007 YoA2007 
Logarithm of GDP LogGDP 
Criminalization of Money Laundering CML 
Regulatory Quality RQ 
Control for Corruption CO 
FATF Membership FATF 
United Nations International Drug Index UNDIX 
Monetary Base 2 in percent of GDP M2 
Trade Openness TO 
Net Interest Margin NIM 
Banking Concentration BC 
Foreign Direct Investment in percent of 
GDP FDP 
Ratio of Net Financial Service Exports RNFSE 
Political Mandates Mandates 
 
Notes: *FATF thematic components and the FATF Compliance Index with the 40 recommendations computed in accordance with Yepes, 2011; 
**Designated Non Financial Business Professionals 
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Table 9 Summary Statistics for all variables 2004-2008: 
 
 
Variable  
  
Obs 
  
Mean 
  
Std. Dev. 
  
Min 
  
Max 
          
Dependent Variables 
Legal    111   42.38138   20.07949   0   100 
Institutional   111   52.28057   21.35757   4.714286   100 
Financial   111   40.5577   18.25084   7.952381   100 
DNFBPs    111   13.3033   15.70219   0   100 
Informal Sector    111   46.21171   27.03227   0   100 
Entity Transparency   111   43.11712   20.53947   0   100 
International Cooperation   111   57.6036   22.15971   0   100 
FATF40 Index   111   41.55527   16.70689   10.08642   100 
Independent Variables 
Year of Assessment 2007  111  0.2702703  0.4461134  0  1 
Logarithm of GDP  110  4.095835  0.5016991  2.948672  5.072608 
Criminalization of Money 
Laundering  
107 
 
2.64486 
 
0.7301116 
 
0 
 
3 
Regulatory Quality  111  63.05642  20.49313  4.890481  100 
Control for Corruption  111  47.02326  23.01614  3.281965  100 
FATF Membership  111  0.2252252  0.419625  0  1 
United Nations 
International Drug Index  
111 
 
15.68261 
 
13.77364 
 
2.23 
 
52.67 
Monetary Base   111  69.99867  48.41524  0  274.6251 
Trade Openness  111  96.51364  55.97927  0.2465088  417.1153 
Net Interest Margin  106  0.044032  0.0259893  0.0062478  0.1272364 
Banking Concentration  99  0.7220368  0.1812192  0.2343564  1 
Foreign Direct Investment  109  0.0782432  0.0791037  -0.0408443  0.4665622 
Ratio of Net Financial 
Service Exports 
  111   1.41679   5.654205   -0.42   42.08 
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Table 10: Correlations Between the Variables for the period 2004-2008: 
 
  FATF40 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP 
YOA 
2007 
RNFSE BC 
FATF40 1              
LogGDP 0.61 1             
CML 0.42 0.53 1            
RQ 0.64 0.82 0.42 1           
CO 0.56 0.77 0.37 0.9 1          
FATF 0.38 0.4 0.24 0.48 0.52 1         
UNDIX 0.02 0.07 -0.1 -0.03 0.02 0 1        
M2 0.43 0.47 0.31 0.56 0.55 0.38 -0.05 1       
TO 0.18 0.3 0.15 0.31 0.28 0.07 -0.13 0.45 1      
NIM -0.52 -0.69 -0.43 -0.56 -0.61 -0.39 -0.1 -0.56 -0.23 1     
FDP 0.28 0.27 0.2 0.29 0.26 -0.07 -0.15 0.38 0.54 -0.18 1    
YoA2007 -0.13 0.06 0.06 0 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.23 -0.1 0.12 1   
RNFSE 0.09 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.19 -0.1 -0.06 0.1 0.05 -0.14 0.25 0.15 1  
BC -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.16 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.05 0.15 0 0.17 1 
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Table 11: Cross Sectional OLS Regression: Determinants of AMLCFT Compliance Index 2004-2008: 
 
 
FATF40 (1)* 
  
FATF40 (2) 
  
FATF40 (3) 
  
FATF40 (4) 
      
LogGDP 10.30316  CML 4.288309  CML 4.526788  CML 4.583773 
 0***   0.02**   0.023**   0.029** 
   RQ 0.5422855  RQ 0.6715799  RQ 0.5623569 
    0***   0***   0.002*** 
   CO -0.154483  CO -0.235855  CO -0.085095 
    0.219   0.112   0.538 
   FATF 4.980065  FATF 2.584053  FATF 1.190234 
    0.137   0.424   0.716 
   UNDIX 0.0909625  UNDIX 0.0870311  UNDIX 0.050524 
    0.184   0.194   0.446 
   M2 0.011831  TO 0.0076395  M2 0.0202103 
    0.706   0.719   0.548 
   TO -0.017964  NIM -79.76668  TO 0.0067321 
    0.473   0.13   0.777 
   FDP 35.935  RNFSE 0.0169336  YOA2007 -4.537664 
    0.043**   0.956   0.109 
   YoA2007 -3.825669  YoA2007 -4.04713  BC -4.58765 
    0.122   0.155   0.416 
Obs 110   Obs 106   Obs 104   Obs 97 
F(1, 109) 966.97  F(9, 97) 195.05  F(9, 95) 195.4  F(9, 88) 190.73 
Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0 
Adj. R-squared 0.899  Adj. R-squared 0.9253  Adj. R-squared 0.9247  Adj. R-squared 0.9308 
R-squared 0.8999   R-squared 0.9316   R-squared 0.9312   R-squared 0.9373 
Notes: *(1), (2),(3) and (4) are references for each equation due to differences in the set of independent variables used; One, two and three asterisks denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.  
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Table 12: Cross Sectional OLS regressions: Determinants of AMLCFT Compliance Index Components 2004-2008: 
 
Legal 
 
Institutional 
 
Financial  
 
DNFBPs  
 Informal 
Sector 
 Entity 
Transparency 
 International 
Cooperation 
       
LogGDP 1.871046  2.92417  1.617067  2.851666  11.50666  9.908157  4.741687 
 0.602  0.423  0.599  0.332  0.034**  0.098*  0.126 
CML 6.523668  4.649899  2.645171  2.42252  -3.534032  1.99029  2.767478 
 0.007***  0.063*  0.274  0.145  0.374  0.625  0.167 
RQ 0.2806856  0.7375489  0.5676806  0.1564122  0.7572728  0.2910251  0.4981622 
 0.239  0.004***  0.01***  0.4  0.018**  0.465  0.021** 
CO 0.0722268  -0.3151741  -0.3299607  -0.0756321  -0.3797612  -0.3190379  -0.2351867 
 0.685  0.106  0.049**  0.617  0.123  0.211  0.118 
FATF 4.866899  2.441641  8.571293  0.1256645  7.746092  -3.651736  4.511491 
 0.281  0.572  0.037**  0.978  0.249  0.489  0.175 
UNDIX 0.0232897  0.1409286  0.1205974  -0.0537365  -0.1482097  0.2018751  0.0390999 
 0.827  0.225  0.233  0.554  0.445  0.209  0.646 
M2 0.0309413  -0.0037754  0.0196866  -0.0322112  -0.0501623  -0.0701771  -0.0124285 
 0.457  0.929  0.592  0.414  0.415  0.195  0.705 
TO -0.0575358  -0.0113962  0.0314186  -0.0354829  -0.084991  -0.0002077  -0.0233498 
 0.075*  0.71  0.278  0.146  0.062*  0.995  0.323 
NIM -64.75596  -142.5942  -52.88995  -172.2218  -226.7456  -171.545  -130.9835 
 0.419  0.06*  0.428  0***  0.036**  0.112  0.035** 
FDP 31.93658  30.0704  33.73684  70.46592  28.49412  42.52147  39.78974 
 0.103  0.123  0.131  0.001***  0.306  0.136  0.024** 
YoA2007 -3.814596  -3.646726  -7.105664  -7.562708  -4.507109  3.135511  -3.987612 
 0.229  0.283  0.021**  0.011**  0.397  0.489  0.119 
Obs 103  103  103  103  103  103  103 
F(11, 92) 94.79  168.2  89.8  14.43  53.05  67.56  163.86 
Prob > F 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Adj R-
squared 
0.9008 
 
0.928 
 
0.8985 
 
0.5874 
 
0.8166 
 
0.8234 
 
0.9363 
R-squared 0.9114  0.9357  0.9093  0.6315  0.8362  0.8423  0.9362 
Notes: One, two and three asterisks denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 13: Summary Statistics for all variables 2006-2015 with 23 Countries: 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Legal 230 54.07971 14.24953 27.83333 100 
Institutional 230 63.70807 13.08657 33.28571 100 
Financial  230 48.34783 15.93796 22.2381 100 
DNFBPs  230 17.36232 16.33941 0 100 
Informal Sector 230 61.54348 23.94039 16.5 100 
Entity Transparency 230 45.3913 23.42623 11 100 
International Cooperation 230 69.32919 16.59391 38.14286 100 
FATF40 Index 230 49.13236 13.69196 24.27778 100 
Key Index  230 31.4686 14.95788 11 100 
Independent Variables 
Year of Assessment 2007 230 0.3478261 0.4773193 0 1 
Logarithm of GDP 230 11.27893 1.085018 8.920046 12.87604 
Criminalization of Money Laundering 230 2.826087 0.4812805 1 3 
Regulatory Quality 230 77.67816 14.17251 39.53347 100 
Control for Corruption 230 64.55241 19.28838 16.6731 100 
FATF Membership 230 0.4347826 0.4968096 0 1 
United Nations International Drug Index 230 22.08217 16.59752 5.06 52.67 
Monetary Base 2 in percent of GDP 230 118.0352 93.62887 0 457.6266 
Trade Openness 230 496.5382 282.002 0.2400975 999.3354 
Net Interest Margin 230 0.0222873 0.0144343 -0.012432 0.0959112 
Banking Concentration 230 0.122341 -0.18204   0 100 
Ratio of Net Financial Service Exports 230 36.71912 21.74364 0 98.76166 
Political Mandates 230 17.56522 11.63051 5 56 
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Table 14: Correlations Between the Variables for the period 2006-2015 with 23 countries: 
 
 
  FATF40 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP YoA 
2007 
RNFSE 
FATF40 1.00             
LogGDP 0.27 1.00            
CML 0.33 0.12 1.00           
RQ 0.23 -0.14 0.26 1.00          
CO 0.09 -0.10 0.28 0.81 1.00         
FATF -0.03 0.59 0.14 0.14 0.20 1.00        
UNDIX -0.46 0.19 -0.24 -
0.74 
-
0.65 
-0.02 1.00       
M2 -0.02 -0.09 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.11 -0.16 1.00      
TO -0.28 0.56 0.01 -
0.24 
-
0.31 
0.28 0.41 -
0.09 
1.00     
NIM -0.45 0.06 -0.23 -
0.47 
-
0.45 
-0.16 0.60 -
0.31 
0.12 1.00    
FDP 0.14 -0.64 0.11 0.26 0.24 -0.24 -0.26 0.31 -
0.55 
-0.15 1.00   
YoA2007 0.33 -0.16 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.10 -0.16 0.02 -
0.29 
0.13 0.08 1.00  
RNFSE -0.12 -0.06 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.15 -0.07 0.24 0.03 -0.29 0.29 -0.32 1.00 
 
Notes: * 23 Countries: Australia, The Bahamas, Bermuda, Belgium, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Chile, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Rep. of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, 
Qatar, Sri Lanka, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 15: Cross Sectional OLS Regression: Determinants of AMLCFT Compliance Index 2006-2015 
23 Countries**: 
 
FATF40 (1)* 
  
FATF40 (2) 
  
FATF40 (3) 
    
LogGDP 4.687452  CML 12.16453  CML 11.53765 
 0***   0***   0*** 
   RQ 0.605749  RQ 0.6436329 
    0***   0*** 
   CO -0.355105  CO -0.352026 
    0***   0*** 
   FATF 0.160587  FATF -0.498754 
    0.918   0.756 
   UNDIX -0.139295  UNDIX 0.0641797 
    0.006***   0.312 
   M2 -0.010197  TO -0.000874 
    0.243   0.787 
   TO -0.003651  NIM -307.5803 
    0.362   0*** 
   FDP -10.16883  RNFSE -0.084111 
    0.052*   0.022** 
   YoA2007 5.475441  YoA2007 6.904317 
    0.002***   0*** 
Obs 230   Obs 230   Obs 230 
F(1, 229) 3304.9  F(9, 221) 856.55  F(9, 221) 974.91 
Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0 
Adj R-squared 0.9227  Adj R-squared 0.9553  Adj R-squared 0.9595 
R-squared 0.9313   R-squared 0.9652   R-squared 0.9677 
 
Notes: *(1),(2),(3) and (4) are references for each equation due to differences in the set of independent variables used; **Variable Banking Concentration was not found for the period 2006-2016 in the following countries: The Bahamas, 
Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Lebanon, Malta, Qatar and Turkey. Therefore, the 4th Specification of part 1 was not computed in parts 2 and 3. One, two and three asterisks denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 16: Cross Sectional OLS regressions: Determinants of AMLCFT Compliance Index Components 2006-2015 with 23 Countries: 
  Legal   Institutional   Financial    DNFBPs P   
Informal 
Sector 
  
Entity 
Transparency 
  
International 
Cooperation 
LogGDP 3.122616  3.772582  3.178291  -0.4203932  5.677966  4.980863  3.834097 
 0***  0***  0***  0.496  0***  0***  0*** 
CML 5.962284  10.5661  11.79681  6.503069  4.566699  3.725441  4.869302 
 0***  0***  0***  0***  0.138  0.07*  0.005*** 
RQ 0.463637  0.3747254  0.1927598  0.0622955  0.8827407  -0.098428  0.730456 
 0***  0***  0.086*  0.546  0***  0.439  0*** 
CO -0.254645  -0.2447405  -0.3544975  0.0338891  -0.7963428  -0.1204323  -0.4995505 
 0***  0***  0***  0.638  0***  0.24  0*** 
FATF -9.936599  -10.42229  -2.186403  -15.15245  9.789  -9.763457  -1.677726 
 0***  0***  0.258  0***  0.001***  0***  0.526 
UNDIX 0.2017923  -0.1169587  -0.1004972  0.0440287  -0.3989185  0.1624763  -0.0677032 
 0.009***  0.091*  0.242  0.587  0.008***  0.097*  0.536 
M2 -0.029605  -0.0175693  -0.0109009  0.0190063  -0.0807461  -0.0882886  -0.0218513 
 0***  0.01***  0.273  0.054*  0***  0***  0.091* 
TO -0.015294  -0.017467  0.0000183  0.0037546  -0.0240945  0.001787  -0.0156747 
 0***  0***  0.997  0.324  0.001***  0.72  0.001*** 
NIM -530.1993  -206.4267  -426.1033  -283.6562  -300.1441  -648.2899  -220.0224 
 0***  0.001***  0***  0***  0.037**  0***  0.01*** 
FDP 1.442306  -10.4391  0.0499001  -3.551477  -12.31743  61.90354  23.98476 
 0.76  0.051*  0.995  0.607  0.191  0***  0.002*** 
Y0A2007 13.87138  4.408181  2.09093  13.35456  4.136149  31.72981  5.550064 
 0***  0.021**  0.467  0***  0.192  0***  0.021*** 
Obs 230   230   230   230   230   230   230 
F(11, 219) 782.39  1407.01  320.16  75.04  317.34  300.29  666.3 
Prob > F 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Adj R-squared 0.9653  0.978  0.9242  0.6898  0.9252  0.8968  0.9552 
R-squared 0.967   0.979   0.9278   0.7046   0.9288   0.9017   0.9573 
Notes: One, two and three asterisks denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 17: Cross Sectional OLS Regression: Determinants of Key Set Compliance Index 2006-2015 
23 Countries * 
 
Key Set (1)* 
  
Key Set (2) 
  
Key Set (3) 
    
LogGDP 2.713055  CML 0.328998  CML -0.613102 
 0***   0.808   0.64 
   RQ 0.3810672  RQ 0.4605129 
    0***   0*** 
   CO 0.0550015  CO 0.018209 
    0.435   0.799 
   FATF -1.664392  FATF -3.515948 
    0.349   0.036** 
   UNDIX -0.083987  UNDIX 0.1376193 
    0.097*   0.05** 
   M2 -0.007897  TO -0.005912 
    0.39   0.052* 
   TO -0.005202  NIM -339.3402 
    0.191   0*** 
   FDP 1.602228  RNFSE 0.0214959 
    0.768   0.624 
   YOA2007 8.643405  YOA2007 11.83628 
    0***   0*** 
Obs 230   Obs 230   Obs 230 
F(1, 229) 831.07  F(9, 221) 198.57  F(9, 221) 227.07 
Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0 
Adj R-squared 0.7781  Adj R-squared 0.8739  Adj R-squared 0.8855 
R-squared 0.779   R-squared 0.8788   R-squared 0.8899 
 
Notes: *(1),(2) and (3) are references for each equation due to differences in the set of independent variables used; 
One, two and three asterisks denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 18: Cross Sectional OLS regressions: Determinants of Key Recommendations Compliance Index by Components 2006-2015 for 
23 Countries 
  
Rec.10 
  
Rec.12 
  
Rec.22 
  
Rec.20 
  
Rec.23 
  
Rec.28 
  
Rec.24 
  
Rec.16 
  
Rec.14 
                  
LogGDP -2.397  -3.744  0.420  7.036  1.214  1.649  -4.242  -5.886  14.811 
 0.009***  0***  0.635  0***  0.155  0.051*  0.003***  0***  0*** 
CML 18.339  8.027  0.428  -28.188  -1.295  6.945  16.756  0.760  -35.889 
 0***  0***  0.833  0***  0.487  0***  0***  0.769  0*** 
RQ 0.577  1.101  0.278  0.602  -0.029  -0.297  0.029  1.397  -0.068 
 0***  0***  0.037**  0.001***  0.805  0.012**  0.890  0***  0.744 
CO -0.538  -0.218  -0.127  -0.062  0.313  0.296  0.409  -0.242  0.505 
 0***  0.03**  0.120  0.710  0.001***  0.001***  0.004***  0.144  0.001*** 
FATF 17.013  -0.647  -5.909  -16.991  -5.463  -17.922  -16.232  11.459  -1.529 
 0***  0.822  0.018**  0***  0.019**  0***  0***  0.005***  0.633 
UNDIX -0.432  0.461  -0.217  0.608  -0.250  -0.226  0.607  0.527  0.033 
 0***  0***  0.023**  0***  0.006***  0.009***  0***  0.001***  0.808 
M2 -0.026  -0.055  0.004  0.014  0.007  -0.076  0.053  0.002  -0.098 
 0.104  0***  0.806  0.459  0.560  0***  0.021**  0.908  0*** 
TO 0.001  -0.037  0.005  0.018  -0.001  0.000  -0.006  0.013  -0.051 
 0.742  0***  0.312  0.023***  0.809  0.941  0.440  0.095*  0*** 
NIM 191.820 
 
-
396.914  
-
323.501  
-974.409 
 
-214.732 
 
-184.837 
 
-346.297 
 
-724.618 
 
-708.091 
 0.028**  0***  0***  0***  0.031**  0.045**  0.006***  0***  0*** 
FDP 30.177  -27.811  2.465  13.036  -16.662  78.542  -21.526  -25.387  7.385 
 0.001***  0.014**  0.785  0.199  0.042**  0***  0.135  0.011**  0.483 
YOA2007 -4.126  2.850  25.693  31.611  15.058  9.106  16.526  -11.889  25.729 
 0.129  0.420  0***  0***  0***  0.001***  0***  0.002***  0*** 
Obs 230   230   230   230   230   230   230   230   230 
F(11, 219) 189.43  56.74  37.37  177.65  59.93  73.25  73.7  64.31  162.59 
Prob > F 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Adj R-
squared 
0.8749 
 
0.7236 
 
0.6414 
 
0.7685 
 
0.6113 
 
0.6951 
 
0.6 
 
0.6454 
 
0.8602 
R-squared 0.8809   0.7369   0.6586   0.817   0.6299   0.7795   0.7097   0.6624   0.8669 
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Table 19: Cross Sectional OLS regressions: FATF40 Index and Key Index for 2006-2015 with with Political Mandates. 
 
FATF40 Index 
  
Key Index 
  
LogGDP 3.278618  LogGDP 1.992849 
 0***   0.007*** 
CML 7.584749  CML -2.803544 
 0***   0.07* 
RQ 0.369766  RQ 0.4273934 
 0.001***   0*** 
CO -0.3308231  CO -0.0765868 
 0***   0.345 
FATF -4.609411  FATF -2.590071 
 0.007***   0.126 
UNDIX -0.0048168  UNDIX 0.0251767 
 0.954   0.738 
M2 -0.0241202  M2 -0.0096035 
 0.009***   0.245 
TO -0.0088798  TO -0.0053161 
 0.013**   0.146 
NIM -427.5233  NIM -345.3415 
 0***   0*** 
FDP 8.377953  FDP 7.565193 
 0.12   0.183 
YOA2007 9.103621  YOA2007 12.39964 
 0***   0*** 
Mandates 0.0110093  Mandates -0.27441 
 0.874   0*** 
Obs 230   Obs 230 
F(12, 218) 645.34  F(12, 218) 200.05 
Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0 
R-squared 0.9659   R-squared 0.8972 
Notes: One, two and three asterisks denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 20: Cross Sectional Regressions Cross Sectional OLS regressions of SARs Fillings, Disseminated SARs and SARs Fillings by Legal Professionals 
on the FATF40 Index and the Key Index for 2006-2015. 
 
SARs Fillings 
     
FATF40 Index 620.8855  Key Index 931.8304 
 0***   0*** 
Obs 213   Obs 213 
F(1, 212) 44.16  F(1, 212) 33.42 
Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0 
R-squared 0.1237   R-squared 0.119 
Disseminated SARs in Percent of total SARs 
     
FATF40 Index 0.4056981  Key Index 0.4959529 
 0***   0*** 
Obs 210   Obs 210 
F(1, 211) 151.87  F(1, 211) 117.04 
Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0 
R-squared 0.4036   R-squared 0.2532 
SARs Fillings by Legal Professionals 
     
FATF40 Index 0.1410588  Key Index 0.2215548 
 0***   0*** 
Obs 204   Obs 204 
F(1, 202) 53.61  F(1, 202) 44.48 
Prob > F 0  Prob > F 0 
R-squared 0.2854   R-squared 0.2903 
Notes: One, two and three asterisks denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 21: Compliance Rating with the Key Set of Recommendations 
 
 
Country Rec.10 Rec.12 Rec.22 Rec.23 Rec.28 Rec.24 Rec.16 Rec.20* Rec.13* SR.SRIV* Total 
                        
Australia 0.33 0.66 0 0 0 0.33 0.33  0.66 0.66 0.3300 
Bahamas, The 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.66 0  0.33 1 0.4044 
Belgium 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33  0.66 1 0.5877 
Bermuda 0.66 0 0 0 1 0 0  0.33 0.33 0.2577 
British Virgin Islands 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.66  0.66 1 0.5144 
Cayman Islands 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.66 0.66 0.33  0.66 0.66 0.5133 
Chile 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.33  0 0 0.1833 
Estonia 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.66 0.66  0.66 0.66 0.5500 
France 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.66 1  0.66 0.66 0.5144 
Germany 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0 1  0.33 0.33 0.2577 
India 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0.33 0  0 0.33 0.1466 
Italy 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 0  0.33 0.33 0.2211 
Japan 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0 0  0.66 0.66 0.2200 
Korea, Rep. 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0.33  0.33 0.33 0.1466 
Latvia 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 0  0.66 0.33 0.2566 
Lebanon 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.66  1 0 0.2577 
Luxembourg 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0.33 0.33  0.33 0.33 0.2200 
Malta 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.33 1 0.33  0.33 0 0.4411 
Portugal 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00   0.66 0.66 0.3311 
Qatar 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.66 0  0.33 0 0.1466 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 1 0.1111 
Turkey 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.33 0.33 0.1100 
United Kingdom 0.33 0 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.33   1 1 0.4788 
 
Source: Mutual Evaluation Reports, FATF 
Notes: *The FATF 40 Recommendations results from compiling the previous FATF 40 +9 Special Recommendations. The FATF 40+9 were re-arranged in 2012 to make the present 40 and recommendation 13 and Special 
Recommendation IV became the new recommendation 20. 
 
 
 81 
 
Table 22: Variables and Sources 
 
Variables and Sources Part 1 
Anti Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism FATF Mutual Evaluations 
Legal Prevention Measures FATF Mutual Evaluations 
Institutional Prevention Measures FATF Mutual Evaluations 
Financial Institutions Prevention Measures FATF Mutual Evaluations 
DNFBPs Prevention Measures FATF Mutual Evaluations 
Informal Sector Prevention Measures FATF Mutual Evaluations 
Entity Transparency Measures FATF Mutual Evaluations 
International Cooperation Measures FATF Mutual Evaluations 
Logarithm of GDP World Development Indicators 23-03-2017 
Criminalization of Money Laundering International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Regulatory Quality World Governance Indicators, World Bank 
Control for Corruption World Governance Indicators, World Bank 
FATF Membership FATF 
United Nations International Drug Index International Drugs Index 2005 
Monetary Base 2 in percent of GDP 
International Financial Statistics (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook. The Economist Intelligence Unit (Country Data). 
World Development Indicators. Federal reserve Economic 
Data. 
Trade Openness World Development Indicators 23-03-2017 
Net Interest Margin World Development Indicators 23-03-2017 
Foreign Direct Investment World Development Indicators 23-03-2017 
Net Interest Margin 
A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. 
World bank 
Ratio of Net Financial Service Exports Zoromé (2017) 
Banking Concentration 
A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. 
World bank 
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Variables and Sources Part 2 & 3 
Suspicious Activity Reports Financial Intelligence Units Official Annual Reports 
Disseminated Suspicious Activity Reports Financial Intelligence Units Official Annual Reports 
Suspicious Activity Reports by Legal Professionals Financial Intelligence Units Official Annual Reports 
Key Set of Recommendations FATF Mutual Evaluations 
Political Mandates Change of Governor General, President or Prime Minister 
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Table 23: Country Sample in Part 1 
Country Sample in Part 1 
Albania Croatia Italy Myanmar South Africa 
Antigua & Barbuda Colombia Israel Namibia Sri Lanka 
Australia Cyprus Jamaica Nepal Spain 
Azerbaijan Czech Republic Japan Nigeria St. Lucia 
Bahamas Denmark Jordan Norway Sudan 
Bahrain Djibouti Korea Palau Sweden 
Barbados Dominican Rep. Kyrgyzstan Panama Switzerland 
Belarus Ecuador Latvia Paraguay Syria 
Belgium Egypt Lithuania Peru Taiwan 
Bermuda Estonia Macao SAR Poland Tajikistan 
Bolivia Fiji Macedonia Portugal Thailand 
Botswana Finland Malawi Qatar Trinidad and Tobago 
British Virgin Is. Gambia Malaysia Romania Tunisia 
Brunei  Georgia Mali Russia Turkey 
Bulgaria Greece Malta Rwanda UAE 
Cambodia Haiti Mauritania Samoa Uganda 
Canada Hong Kong  Mauritius San Marino UK 
Cape Verde Hungary Mexico Seychelles Ukraine 
Cayman islands Iceland Moldova Sierra Leone Uruguay 
Chile India Mongolia Singapore USA 
China Indonesia Montenegro Slovakia  Vanuatu 
Costa Rica Ireland Morocco Slovenia Yemen 
    Zimbabwe 
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Stata Code: Part 1 range A:2 to Z:114 
rename A Country 
rename B Year 
rename C Legal 
rename D Institutional 
rename E Financial 
rename F DNFBPs 
rename G Informal 
rename H Transparency 
rename I International 
rename J AML 
rename K CFT 
rename L AMLCFT 
rename M Overall 
rename N Yoa2007 
rename O LogGDP 
rename P CML 
rename Q RQ 
rename R CO 
rename S FATF 
rename T UNDIX 
rename U M2 
rename V TO 
rename W NIM 
rename X BC 
rename Y FDP 
rename Z RNFSE 
sum 
pwcorr 
regress Legal LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress Institutional LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress Financial LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress DNFBPs LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress Informal LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress Transparency LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress International LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress Overall LogGDP, noconstant 
regress Overall CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO FDP Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress Overall CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX  TO NIM RNFSE Yoa2007, noconstant 
regress Overall CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX   M2 TO Yoa2007 BC, noconstant 
 
Stata Code: Part 2 & 3 range A:2 to AN:232 
rename A Country 
rename B Year 
rename C STRs 
rename D Diss 
rename E DissPercent 
rename F STRslaw 
rename G LogGDP 
rename H CML 
rename I FATF 
rename J UNDIX 
rename K M2 
rename L TO 
rename M NIM 
rename N FDP 
rename O RNFSE 
rename P CO 
rename Q RQ 
rename R MyRating 
rename S Overall 
rename T Mandates 
rename U R10 
rename V R12 
rename W R22 
rename X R23 
rename Z R28 
rename AA R16 
rename AB R13 
rename AC R14 
rename AD PF 
rename AE Ctax 
rename AF COA 
rename AG Legal 
rename AH INstitutional 
rename AI Financial 
rename AJ DNFBPs 
rename AK Informal 
rename AL Transparency 
rename AM International 
rename AN AMLCFT 
sum 
regress Overall LogGDP, noconstant 
regress Overall CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO FDP COA, noconstant 
regress Overall CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX  TO NIM RNFSE COA, noconstant 
regress Legal LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress INstitutional LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress Financial LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress DNFBPs LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress Informal LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress Transparency LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress International LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress MyRating LogGDP, noconstant 
regress MyRating CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO FDP COA, noconstant 
regress MyRating CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX  TO NIM RNFSE COA, noconstant 
regress R10 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress R12 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress R22 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress R23 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress Y LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress R28 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress R16 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress R13 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
regress R14 LogGDP CML RQ CO FATF UNDIX M2 TO NIM FDP COA, noconstant 
pwcorr 
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